POLITICAL SCIENCE

Vol. 11

1959

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School of Political Science and
Public Administration
KRAUS REPRINT LTD.
Nendeln/Liechtenstein 1967

Printed in Germany

Lessing-Druckerei Wiesbaden

Political Science

VOLUME 11 *MARCH 1959* *NUMBER 1*

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Monarchy and Republic in the New World

GERALD S. GRAHAM

I AM HAPPY to be in Wellington on the last stage of a tour that has taken me halfway round the world; and needless to say my pleasure is increased by the honour you have done me in asking me to give the second Collins Memorial lecture before, what is, I have been told by a well-meaning friend, 'one of the most critical audiences in New Zealand'.

However, I am sustained in my present plight by the thought that today is Canada's birthday. Ninety-one years ago, a few far-seeing men, The Fathers of Confederation, with the help of the British government established precariously a nation called Canada, whose chances of survival seemed very slim. They were bold, optimistic and wise men, and this evening I call on their ghosts to give me courage on this great anniversary occasion.

It is an occasion made possible by the generosity and imagination of Dr. W. E. Collins, in his day a distinguished physician of Wellington, a member of the Senate of the University of New Zealand and a member of the Legislative Council. Dr. Collins' love of country extended beyond New Zealand to embrace the Commonwealth – a Commonwealth standing today for certain clear-cut values and principles which the growth of totalitarian power has served to bring sharply into relief.

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I propose to sketch this evening the historical relations between the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. Too often today there is a tendency to treat contemporary or current problems in a vacuum, or more frequently to look into the past for illustrations or lessons to illuminate the present. One is sometimes reminded of Gulliver's visit to the city of Lagado, where he discovered a zealous architect, whose first principle in construction was to begin with the roof and build downwards towards the foundation.

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1 This is the revised version of a lecture originally given before the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, and printed in *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume X, No. 2, June, 1957. It was delivered at the Victoria University of Wellington as the W. E. Collins Memorial Lecture for 1958.

But even in building upwards from early foundations, as I shall attempt to do, while there is not the same danger of distorting the past to gratify the present, there is, nonetheless, the danger of obscuring the truth by streamlining the structure ; by trying to make a tidy mansion out of what may have been a very make-shift shack. It is always tempting to ease the task of rapid reconstruction with a nice pattern of presuppositions.

I shall do my best to build an honest and well-proportioned structure, but I fear that much more learned historians than myself would have to confess that one lecture on 'Monarchy and Republic in the New World' – involving the development of a triangular association – part British, part American, part Canadian – must inevitably involve certain distortions.

• • •

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was a colony or, rather, several colonies, in the northern half of North America which became Canada, and two major powers that were interested in this loosely-held territory, Britain and the United States. Canada hardly counted, except as a factor in British-American relations. The Americans regarded Canada as a spur of British imperialism on the North American continent, and the seat of an unwholesome monarchical government which should soon be vacated in the name of a slogan, eventually to be called *Manifest Destiny*. The British quite rightly regarded the United States as an expansionist power, determined to be emancipated from Europe, and bent on bringing within her domain under the slogan of Manifest Destiny the huge area which Britain had painfully won from France during the Seven Years War. At times Britain was to have serious doubts as to the value of her North American possessions, but she was never prepared to abandon them to the mercies of American expansionists, whom colonials could not have resisted by themselves.

Yet at this time and during a large part of the nineteenth century American expansionists counted on Canada as ultimately bound to become a state of the Union, and the stimulus to annexation was more than a matter of pure imperial sentiment. No one hundred per cent. American really believed that the monarchical system could last in North America, especially in a country lying in close contact with a democracy of the American type. In the long run, it was assumed that Canadians, zealous to be free and self-governing, would seek the arms of their freedom-loving republican cousins to the south.

It is a little more difficult to know what Canadians felt about all this ; some of them no doubt agreed, that they were 'the lamb awaiting the inevitable slaughter'. Most of them were irritated and afraid. United Empire Loyalists hated the United States ; French Canadians viewed all its works, if not with abhorrence, at least with apprehension. But there were a few Canadians who realised that American misunderstanding of the colony's position resulted as much from ignorance as from malice. The dominant fact in the history of the United States had been the American Revolution ; and with independence came self-government. To Americans such a *Revolution* seemed inevitable not only for themselves, but for others, whether Latin Americans or Canadians. How else could self-government be secured ? Yet to some far-seeing men of that day, Canadian and British, revolution was not inevitable ; and looking back over a century, historians can say that Lord Durham's simple solution of 1840 (local self-government) justified the uncanny optimism of these men, by pointing the way towards independent nationhood without revolution.

But American misunderstanding of British thought and practice was also owing to an identification of the terms *democracy, republicanism* and *liberty*. In the United States, the march of democracy was accepted as part of the Law of Progress. For more than 150 years American political leaders used the catch-word 'democracy' in their speeches, but ordinarily linked it with such phrases as : the equality of all men and their inalienable right to freedom, justice and opportunity. These simple, fervent and honest professions of faith could, however, be expressed in various ways. In some States, American judges could be elected ; and in many early American elections for sheriff or senator not all who ran could read. Democracy then as now meant counting heads, not intellects ; but the tendency was to associate this practice with liberty – a special kind of liberty that could only be fully enjoyed in republics, whose purity was guaranteed by an inflexible constitution.

For American liberty was also identified with a single written document called the American Constitution ; and the American Constitution has provided even to this day the major example of American democratic idealism. It has remained the symbol of the new democracy that was achieved by breaking from the British Empire. The separation of powers between Executive and Legislature – a division guaranteed by the Constitution in the interests of liberty – has been cherished as the safeguard of the very liberty which on occasion it may curtail or deflect.

In Canada, I think that much suspicion of the United States is based on a deep distrust of the American system of government – especially the constitutional division of powers between President and a Congress, that appears to Canadians to be occasionally irresponsible and frequently incapable of thinking in larger terms of national interest.

In Canada, as in Britain, the constitution of government was never regarded with such reverence, partly because there was no rigid single constitution founded on a revolution, and partly because Canada inherited the British mixture of written law, precedent and convention. Of course, lack of reverence need not mean lack of smugness; and the incapacity of Americans to understand the structure and spirit of the British constitution has always tickled the vanity of those Britons or Canadians who have regarded the unsystematic complexity of their institutions as a glorification of national illogicality – as evidence of genius working out undirected under the Divine Blessing. 'We Englishmen are very proud of our Constitution, sir,' said Mr. Podsnap *(Our Mutual Friend)* to his French guest. 'It was bestowed upon us by Providence.'

But to return to actual practice. The British did not equate popular democracy with liberty, but put their emphasis on individual liberty under the law. It was the *rule of law,* and not the rule of the herd that mainly influenced Canadian conceptions of democracy. Indeed, we know now that the American concept of democracy rather than encouraging the growth of Canadian self-government in the nineteenth century actually retarded it; the fight for responsible government in Canada was quite as much a battle against conservative Canadians who feared the violent and egalitarian aspects of American political life as a fight against an over-cautious and imperious Mother Country. Indeed, it is fair to say that self-government in Canada was achieved by disdaining and eventually turning away from republican models towards British parliamentary procedure.

It is important today not to minimise these differences in background which affect present outlook. In the past there was too much unctuous talk about 'blood being thicker than water' or about Canada's rôle as interpreter between two great kindred powers. With regard to the latter aphorism, there is probably more evidence against than for such an interpretation. Effortless understanding between Americans, British and Canadians has never been easy, excluding of course, direct personal contacts among people, who especially in time of emergency reveal a remarkable identity of viewpoint. Perhaps it is because we have a common language, and certain obvious similarities in our way of life, that we assume that divergencies should not exist. In time of emergency, such as war, we minimise them ; but it is not sensible to minimise them all the time. Differences in points of view or manners or methods do exist.

Actually, the present North Atlantic triangle of friendly associations was shaped less by positive affection than by quarrels which forced compromises, less by affinities than by antipathies. But let us look back into history.

After the Treaty of Ghent in 1814, many people, British and Americans, believed that only another war could settle all the outstanding controversies, relating to boundaries, fisheries and fur trade. These disputes were between Great Britain and the United States, with Canada and the Maritime Provinces bounced or kicked between the two major contestants.

In 1838, James Buchanan, the British consul in New York, warned his government that war could be anticipated on fifteen different grounds, and that all these potential causes of war had been brewing for fifteen years. Certainly, if war came, the colonies would be at stake, and few Canadians had much hope of existing as British subjects should British protection be withdrawn. Furthermore, it was pretty well realised both in Britain and the United States that the inland colonies (the Canadas – now Ontario and Quebec) were not defensible – and the '3,000 miles of unguarded frontier' may be ascribed solely to the fact that Britain was neither in a position to build costly fortifications over so lengthy a frontier, nor to defend them against the United States even if they had been built.

Nonetheless, a partial attempt at construction was made. Forts were built at Quebec, Halifax and Kingston, and military canals like the Rideau or the Lachine were constructed at great expense. The British government spent millions against the probability of another war ; and, the building of such British defences against potential American aggressions was continued until 1871.[2]

As for the United States, the Republic could afford to neglect its northern frontier ; with superior manpower, internal communications and industrial organisation it possessed an enormous advantage. But on the sea-board, matters were reversed. History had taught Americans how easily the Royal Navy could bring its force to bear on their cities and trade routes from such convenient ports as Halifax or

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[2] C. P. Stacey, 'The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-71', *American Historical Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 1, October 1950, pp. 3-4.

Bermuda. Hence, the Americans spent their millions in fortifying their Atlantic coastline. Out of some 8,000,000 dollars appropriated for fortifications between 1816-29, not more than 200,000 appears to have been spent on the Canadian border.[3]

Actually, the friction never got beyond the stage of 'cold war', chiefly because neither Britain nor the United States in the last resort were anxious to precipitate a war. In the 1840's when disputes over boundaries, the slave trade and extradition seemed likely to bring relations to the 'flash-point', there was Lord Aberdeen in the Foreign Office to exercise his well-known arts of conciliation; and Americans in the State Department were to greet his initial efforts for a settlement as a 'happy augury'. Or there was Prince Albert, intervening in timely fashion over the Trent Affair at the outbreak of the Civil War, and preventing Lord Russell from sending one of his stinging despatches. Flags in several American cities fell to half mast when news of Prince Albert's death arrived.

And back of the arguments against war, lay free trade – linked in the minds of its British advocates with peace, economy and prosperity. Wars were expensive, and especially *wars to retain colonies,* colonies which were, in the minds of most moderate men, sooner or later bound to leave the Mother Country in any event.

Yet the two countries came close to war in 1861. The success of the American Union lay in the balance, and when the Civil War began the British supported the South, partly for sentimental reasons, partly no doubt because a divided United States would be less dangerous. The North was rightly irritated and truculent, and hence the existence of the British colonies was in the balance.

Once again, antipathies were to play a vital part in the final settlement. Historians have shown that out of the frictions born of the American Civil War was shaped the final British policy – a completely revised British policy, which supported a transcontinental union – the Dominion of Canada.[4] American scholars have shown that the politicians who cried out for annexation of Canada during and immediately after the Civil War and who frightened British politicians were less interested in acquiring British colonial territory than in gaining political advantages at home. (This is also true today, there is much political rhetoric intended for home consumption.) Nonetheless, the effect upon British policy – and Canadian – was the same as if these politicians had been deliberate and honest in their propaganda. Antipathies unloosed events which brought the Dominion of Canada into being ; a unified Canada might one day leave the Empire of her own accord, said British statesmen, but she should at least have a decent chance of survival. A consolidated colony would present a stronger front to aggressions real or potential from the south. Furthermore, in the minds of British statesmen, there may have been the feeling too that the making of a nation would mean a shift of responsibility – the prospect of a reduction in points of friction with the United States when a young federation learned to stand on its own feet. Already, the maintenance of peace with the United States was emerging as a positive doctrine of British foreign policy.

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[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6; also by the same author, *The Undefended Border, The Myth and the Reality,* Canadian Historical Association Booklets, No. 1 (Ottawa, 1953), p. 9.

[4] Fear of the United States, wrote J. B. Brebner, was the principal cause of the 'germinal federation' of the four eastern British North American provinces. *North Atlantic Triangle* (New Haven and Toronto), 1949, p. 169.

Admittedly, the new Dominion which took shape under British auspices between 1867 and 1873 was little more than a geographical expression, and there was still hope in some American quarters of winning northern territories in compensation for the depredations wrought by the British-equipped raider *Alabama* during the Civil War. But these and other points of conflict were resolved by the Treaty of Washington in 1871. Eighteen hundred and seventy-one is a great water-shed of Anglo-American-Canadian relations. There was tough, hard bargaining and recrimination, but out of it all there was to come gradually, as after events were to prove, the American acceptance of the division of the North American Continent between a Republic, and a self-governing nation that still retained its loyalty to the Mother Country and the Empire.

But this attitude was of slow growth. Many Americans assumed that under tariff pressure alone, Canada would in the long run be compelled to join the Republic. 'I know,' declared Secretary of State Seward in 1867, 'that Nature designs that this whole continent . . . shall be, sooner or later, within the magic circle of the American Union.[5] Two years later, Grant's secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, was prepared to 'kick or kiss' the Dominion into the Union.[6]

Lacking the self-reliance that comes from economic self-sufficiency and close political unity (there was no trans-continental railway until 1885), some three million Canadians had, perforce, to depend for security almost entirely on the weight and bargaining power of British diplomacy. In other words, Canada, although now a Dominion, was still in the frustrating position of being a national midget on a stage dominated by two great powers. Sometimes, indeed, Canadians were inclined to believe that British governments placed Anglo-American understanding far ahead of Canadian rights; and angry Canadian politicians dug deep in history books to read the long list of boundary surrenders that marked the course of British diplomacy from the Peace of 1783 to the Oregon Settlement of 1846, to the Treaty of Washington in 1871 and finally, the Alaska Boundary award in 1903. The first Prime Minister of Canada, John A. MacDonald, himself complained that in 1871 he had had to endanger his own political future and sacrifice the interests of his country for the sake of preserving good Anglo-American relations.

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[5] Brebner, op. cit., p. 165.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

It is true that British governments were now deeply anxious to remain on friendly terms with the United States, and appeasement sometimes meant yielding on certain peculiarly Canadian issues such as fisheries or boundaries. With world-wide responsibilities, which they were reluctant to extend, and dominated by the Free Trade ideal, British statesmen were *not* prepared to press Canadian claims at the risk of war. No matter how just the Canadian cause, British statesmen were unwilling to provoke the United States with any show of 'mailed fist' diplomacy. And looking backwards, it must be admitted that Canada had much more to lose from a just war than from an unjust treaty. Canadians might continue to curse the timidity of British diplomats, but it is certain that Macdonald's policy was right; that Canadian statesmen, if left to their own resources, could not have maintained the national existence at all. There was one brief war scare in 1895 following President Cleveland's Venezuela challenge, but it blew over quickly; and serious international questions disappeared with it. My generation has never known or considered the possibility of military precautions on Canada's southern boundary. The border that had heaved and trembled under crises for the greater part of the nineteenth century achieved its present peaceful demeanour before that century had run its length.

Out of the conflicts of power during those years, a nation, Canada, had been able to take shape; indeed, its development had been guided and accelerated by the conflicts. Amid the play of power politics, Canada was able to resist successfully both republicanism and colonialism. Because there was a real balance of forces, she was able to resist American absorption on the one hand, and any form of continued colonial status on the other.[7] It is possible, of course, to exaggerate the benefits of being a pawn between the giants; but it is no exaggeration to say that the present Canadian North American nation was a product of the long, bloodless feud; and it is no exaggeration to add that the birth of a self-governing Canadian nation did improve relations in equal proportion between Great Britain and the United States. Twisting the lion's tail might remain an American election pastime for some years to come, but a new and happier era had really opened. The settlement of the Alaska Boundary dispute and the establishment of the permanent International Joint Commission in 1909 did mark the beginnings of what President Roosevelt was subsequently to call the *Good Neighbour* policy.

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[7] See George W. Brown, *The Growth of Peaceful Settlement between Canada and the United States* (Contemporary Affairs Pamphlet, Toronto, 1948), p. 4.

At the same time a new spirit of Canadian nationalism was beginning to flourish. With the opening of the twentieth century, the Canadian West became the scene of a veritable stampede for free land. Settlers from eastern Canada, the United States and Europe rolled into the prairies at the rate of two and three hundred thousand a year, forcing the creation of two new provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan, in 1905. It was the expansion of the American frontier that had fostered a genuine consciousness of nationhood in the United States. The peopling of the Canadian prairies provided a similar stimulus to Canadian national consciousness; Canada had reached sensitive adolescence, and was beginning to 'feel her oats'.

Moreover, in 1910 at the end of the most prosperous and optimistic decade in Canadian history, the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, had finally negotiated what every government had sought since confederation – a reciprocity trade pact in natural produce of the farm, forest, river and mine – with the United States. President Taft was eager to give the Canadians a good bargain, in the hope of stamping out the last embers of ill-will that boundary disputes and United Empire Loyalists' resentments had kept alive. He was sincerely anxious to make of Canada a trusting friend. Unhappily, the agreement encountered much opposition in Congress, and was only forced through by ill-adroit use of the argument that reciprocity was a practical step towards continental union. (Once again, this was rhetoric intended for home consumption.) The use of such arguments were sufficient to insure its defeat in the Canadian election of 1911. The long-sought prize was within their grasp; yet the Canadian people, impelled by a new sense of national destiny, rose in revolt against an arrangement that suggested peaceful annexation. Even the little man was suddenly prepared to pay more for his bacon or his bicycle than have his country's independence jeopardised.

Now, Americans were perhaps rightly perplexed by the vigour of Canadian nationalism, as demonstrated in the election of 1911. It was difficult to take much stock in Canadian autonomy, when most of the formal official contacts were made through the British embassy in Washington or through the British foreign office; and the use of monarchical symbols and imperial institutions still suggested colonial rather than national and democratic realities. It was to Americans, therefore, amazing, and highly enlightening that this colonial spawn of European imperialism should reveal an almost jingoistic national spirit, a determination to preserve a free hand in the North American continent to work out its own national destiny, and, at the same time, show an equally aggressive determination to preserve the British connection.

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Meanwhile, other developments had begun slowly to clarify the situation and make for a new sense of confidence in the triangular relationship. Along with the American retreat from imperialism, evidenced in Woodrow Wilson's Mexican policy, came the gradual recognition of Canada's growing national stature. Representation in 1917 on the Imperial War Cabinet was followed in 1919, against the opposition of the United States delegation, by membership in the Peace Conference. This hard-won victory was confirmed by admission to the League of Nations along with the right of membership in the Council.

Then came the twenties and the fight for international recognition — viz., *Dominion status.* During the twenties Canada emphatically indicated that she was going to formulate and implement her own foreign policy separately from the United Kingdom, and the Report of the Imperial Conference of 1926 endorsed without qualification the theory upon which the declaration was made. By the end of the twenties Canada had reached the Promised Land of Independence within a Commonwealth. But beyond the announcement little happened. The personnel of the External Affairs Department (which Laurier founded in 1909) had been slightly increased in number; the first three legations were established at Washington, Paris and Tokyo; yet in the rest of the world, Canada remained dependent upon the diplomatic and consular services of the United Kingdom. Hence the unhappy period of adolescence continued.

The habit of pleading indifference towards, or distrust of the Mother Country became, perhaps, the major characteristic of this first phase of Canada's career in international affairs. The importance of membership in the Commonwealth was deliberately under-rated officially and unofficially; the government city of Ottawa afforded ample opportunities for the creation of a collective opinion, and the insinuation of a common attitude. Involvement in British foreign affairs might mean danger to status. Europe, including Britain, was a dark and sinister cauldron that brewed wars and troubles. Canada, it was argued, should cut her commitments to the League of Nations, just as she had already cut her commitments inside the Commonwealth. A British Commonwealth *bloc*, declared Mr. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, would excite resentful opposition throughout the world.

There was, in short, a reaction from the old British Empire – a shift of emphasis between the wars, for Canada had suddenly realised she was a North American state. And academic people made the remarkable discovery that Canada had its own North American culture. 'A whole new generation of politicians, publicists, journalists and professors,' wrote D. G. Creighton of the University of Toronto, 'the professional nationalists of the 1930's – arose to extol the sufficiency and normality of our North Americanism.'[8] The denigration of Empire became a fashionable exercise in which various University intellectuals felt they must engage. I recall that a future Canadian civil servant, when a Rhodes scholar in the late twenties, spoke at a Rhodes dinner in Oxford about the 'sinister Imperial influences' in Britain, and (jestingly, of course) of the need to tear down and rebuild Oxford in modern brick in order to change the intellectual ethos of the country. A few of my old colleagues in Canada used to talk vaguely about British imperialism, and 'power politics' and 'big interests' in Britain that might threaten Canadian independence. Alas, it is a vanished age. These people are all respectable, middle-of-the-road citizens now, and talk about the joys of consultation and co-operation in a loose Commonwealth.

And yet to Americans, and quite rightly, there was every evidence that Imperial sentiment still survived. The Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa in 1932 may have demonstrated the urgent nationalism of the Dominion, but the organisation of a scheme of Imperial preferences made abundantly clear that the newly recognised independent state had no desire to throw in her lot exclusively with North America.

In other words, it was still recognised in Canada that, apart from sentiment, the maintenance of close ties with Great Britain was a useful safeguard against peaceful or economic absorption by the United States; and after the last war, and today, it is still being argued that Canada's freedom of action will depend upon her association with an economically resuscitated and powerful Great Britain, and that Canadian real autonomy would be profoundly affected by Britain's reduction from the ranks of the leading powers.

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[8] *Canada's To-Morrow*, ed. G. P. Gilmour (Toronto, 1954), pp. 231-2; see also, 248-51.

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Today, Canada has outgrown North American solidarity as an end in itself. It has become fashionable to accept a concept of defensive unity of North America and western Europe, and to talk about the 'North Atlantic Community'. The intellectual vogue of the late twenties and thirties was based on a kind of North American parochialism; now, the 'North Atlantic Community' tends to be the vogue both in Canada and the United States. This concept has very limited historical foundations and is based on the present need for unity in the defence of western Europe and western civilisation —an extremely sensible credo in the light of present world perils.

As for the United States, happily, the vogue of Manifest Destiny is over; instead, as I have already stated, there has developed in the United States a firm acceptance of Canada's genuine independent nationhood – an acceptance which was greatly facilitated by a new emphasis in British policy on Anglo-American friendship.

In consequence, the one-time British colony has ceased to be regarded as an alien offshoot of English imperialism on the North American continent; indeed, within the last few years, as the world has shrunk in time and space, Americans have become aware of the British Isles as a vital part of their own outer defences. 'Isolationism' is no longer a creed recommended by serious American publicists or historians; and while it is true that the Republican Party remains slightly divided on foreign policy, this division is no longer based on the inflexible principles of keeping aloof from Europe. Indeed the late high priest of isolation and Anglophobia, Colonel McCormick, before his death produced a handsome large-scale map showing the countries that the United States must defend against Russia. This map included the United Kingdom!

Today there is both diffidence and fear in the United States, because for the first time in her history she feels she stands alone as a Great Power in the West – no nineteenth-century *Pax Britannica* to shield her – 'no one behind her but the sea'. Hence in contrast to former fears and jealousies of 'perfidious Albion', Washington has become increasingly anxious that Americans should recognise the 'historic and geographical pattern of affinities', that binds together Monarchy and Republic. In the face of common danger, the State Department has accepted Sir Winston Churchill's judgment that the future of the civilised world will depend in large part on the continued fraternal association of the British Commonwealth and the United States.

Today, the requirements of defence, resulting from the discovery of the atomic bomb, the perfection of airborne missiles, and the prospect of even more abrupt means of obliteration have drawn both Canada and Britain more closely within the American orbit. As a consequence of scientific developments, the three countries in the North Atlantic Triangle have been brought into a relationship of peculiar intimacy, which in these precarious days can have no fixed limit.

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History has gone a full circle since the days of the American Revolution. Once more destiny has brought together Great Britain and her erstwhile North American colonies, Canada and the United States. For a 'way of life', liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, they will have to stick together, even if they find the process occasionally exasperating, and sometimes even painful.

Peter Fraser at San Francisco

EUGENE P. CHASE

THE RETURN of the Labour party in New Zealand to power reminds me of my close association with the wartime Prime Minister of an earlier Labour government, Peter Fraser, at the San Francisco Conference on International Organisation in 1945. I suppose that by this time Fraser has been received into history as one of that great succession of radical leaders who have contributed so much to the development of New Zealand. Of this I know nothing, though I can imagine his constant care for the interests of his party and of his country. But I saw him constantly for two months in San Francisco.

The drafting of the Charter of the United Nations was to a large extent done by the 'great powers', and on certain matters, such as the veto, they insisted that their proposals should be followed, unchanged. In other respects the lesser powers (and these without any special relation to their size or strength) exercised great influence to modify the rigid formulas of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and of the Yalta Conference.

Among the most effective of the small powers was New Zealand, partly no doubt because of its close working alliance with Australia, but chiefly, I think, because of the personality of its prime minister Peter Fraser.

At San Francisco Mr. Fraser served as the chief delegate of New Zealand and as chairman of Committee II/4, the Committee on Trusteeship. I saw him almost only in his work with that committee, and it is in that connection alone that I can speak of him from direct knowledge. I remember, however, and should start by reminding the reader, that he was not only the head of the New Zealand delegation but almost the New Zealand delegation itself. He was Minister of External Affairs, as well as Prime Minister. Though Carl Berendsen, the second man in the delegation, was an experienced diplomat, he did not attempt to be more than that. Fraser was the maker of policy, Fraser was the exponent of policy, and no one doubted that he had the entire support of New Zealand behind him. As the self-confident and trusted representative of that important member of the United Nations, he did not limit himself to the Trusteeship Committee. He spoke, and spoke effectively, for New Zealand and its point of view in the committees that dealt with the 'veto' in the Security Council, and also in the committee on the Economic and Social Council. In a sense, he may have been more himself in these other committees, since no chairman, even a Fraser, is quite free to say what he wants to say.

Fraser was chairman of the Trusteeship Committee because the creators of the Conference, the committee of sponsoring powers that worked in Washington before we took the trek to San Francisco, had chosen him, presumably as a competent representative of the smaller powers, conservative enough not to upset the overall plans of the great powers, and interested in the subject matter of the Committee. This Committee, most of the time, was considered the best show of any of the committees, because of the novelty of its subject matter and the controversies it aroused. We could tell because the visitors' seats along the wall had larger crowds than any other, except for the few days towards the end of the Conference when the 'veto' was being argued in another committee of the Conference. The area of our Committee was relatively unexplored. The issues were explosive—even more so than we realised then. And the divisions of opinion were extreme. After all, that Committee took as its frame of reference not only the former mandates and the trust territories to come, but all the problems of the entire colonial world.

Our Committee was expected to be important, and was provided with an adequate staff. I was appointed secretary of the Committee—officially by the same group that appointed Fraser chairman, actually because I had been working on problems of dependent areas in the Department of State, and also on questions of the British Commonwealth. I was one of the senior officers of the Department who instead of being named adviser to the United States delegation was lent by that delegation to the Conference Secretariat. At the time my actual Departmental title was Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs.

In the Department of State we had all been concerned with post-war possibilities in the colonial world, and I had shared in preparing the basic documentation of the American delegation. At San Francisco we served the Committee, of course, and not the delegation, but we had the technical knowledge to serve the Committee intelligently, and enough personal acquaintance with the Conference machinery to facilitate the production of documents, the furnishing of information, and so on.

I had heard of Fraser with great interest for a couple of years before I met him in San Francisco. As a specialist in Commonwealth affairs I knew that New Zealand was under a powerful and conservative government of its Labour party, under the Scottish-New Zealander Peter Fraser who was both Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, that it was the most 'British' of the 'dominions', and I knew its difficult position in the Pacific. We had watched, with great interest, efforts to end the isolation of individual members of the Commonwealth which had been caused by the Japanese advance in the early years of the war. In particular, we had noted the 'Anzac Pact' between Australia and New Zealand which suggested a joint policy for their activities in the Pacfic. This policy was one of co-operation for these two countries, who were obliged to treat themselves as more independent than previously. It also contained proposals for an up-to-date common policy in regard to native problems in the South Pacific. And it provided for close co-operation between the very young foreign services of the two countries.

It had been assumed, perhaps, that this Australian-New Zealand Agreement was largely drafted by Herbert V. Evatt of Australia (who was Minister of External Affairs) and his assistants. We were to see that though Fraser seemed more old-fashioned than Evatt, the cordial working relationship between the two, and their basic position as democratic statesmen in new countries, lent great strength to each. When they were more or less alone together Evatt would address Fraser as 'Peter' in his characteristic Australian manner, with obvious regard, and Fraser, though stiffer and less articulate, appeared to admit the political agreement and to return the regard.

The officers of the Trusteeship Committee were Mr. Fraser as chairman and Joseph Bech, Foreign Secretary of Luxembourg, as rapporteur. In actuality the rapporteurs' functions were largely performed in the committees by spokesmen of the great powers and off the floor by the Secretariat, so that Bech's only duty was to sit on Fraser's right at committee meetings, while I sat on his left. Very shortly after the Conference began, Mr. Bech had to go home: his government had fallen, and because (so he told me) SHAEF lay across all channels of communication between San Francisco and Luxembourg, he had to return in person. (He is today still Foreign Secretary, and also Prime Minister.) His place was pleasantly taken by the second member of his delegation, Mr. Hughes LeGallais, the Minister of Luxembourg to the United States.

Fraser and his delegation were housed in the Sir Francis Drake Hotel, perhaps not the first in prestige, but one of the most comfortable. The delegates had bedrooms on one floor and on another a suite of offices (in which they forgathered) with one separate office for Fraser, from which he directed the Committee and at the same time ruled nearly 1,800,000 New Zealanders.

The New Zealand delegation in San Francisco was small. The Prime Minister, as I have recorded, was also Minister of External Affairs. As there was then no real differentiation in Wellington between the two functions of the office, so there was no differentiation in the delegation. Mr. A. D. McIntosh, Secretary for External Affairs and Secretary to the War Cabinet, was the Prime Minister's understudy in everything. The other members of the delegation, keen, competent, and devoted as they were, illustrated the fact that anything in the nature of a foreign office staff or a foreign service for New Zealand was still to come. The same thing seemed as true of the Australian delegation. That delegation however had co-chairmen, Mr. Francis Michael Forde, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Army, and Dr. Evatt, the Attorney General and Minister for External Affairs. It was the latter who took the lead in San Francisco. The Australian staff, however, was about as unspecialised in background as that of New Zealand.

The difficulties were obvious, namely those of a small delegation in a large conference where there were a dozen committees meeting each at least once a week and some of them two or three times, so that a delegation might sometimes need representation at three meetings a day. The difficulties were perhaps increased for the New Zealanders by the fact that the delegation was not specialised. Fraser, who alone carried weight, and who looked on the younger men merely as his assistants, was likely to turn up at any meeting which had been called, and he, of course, as head of the delegation attended himself meetings of the Steering Committee. I remember going once to the meeting of another committee than my own and seeing a young delegate sitting uneasily behind the New Zealand name sign. He said Fraser was on his way. Fraser arrived late, but before he had been there long made a speech, and a very good one. My English colleague one day followed Fraser around in his journeyings, and said that though his attendance at committees was only part time, he was usually one of the speakers.

Fraser was a man of great endurance and energy, who needed relatively little sleep. His staff looked more and more tired as the Conference wore on. They had to accompany him and take care of him during the working hours, and had also to prepare for the day's programme and record its activities. I remember once coming out of a meeting with Fraser and McIntosh very late one night and being offered a ride home to my hotel. Fraser's conference limousine was parked behind the Opera House. Curled up in the front seat was the American sergeant who drove it, asleep in the soft Californian air. Fraser woke him gently ; his deep consideration for others, sometimes bypassed by press of business, was very clear.

Things were made easier for New Zealand because its policy was traditionally British, with overtones of support for the United States. Since the United States and the United Kingdom generally agreed, New Zealand had no serious conflicts. On questions of the Pacific and of trusteeship, and in insisting that a certain democratic tone or tendency should as far as possible pervade the Charter, New Zealand and Australia worked together. The very articulate and conspicuous spokesman of the Anzac dominions was Dr. Evatt. He was, indeed, the arch-politician of the Conference. But Fraser always proved to be on the same side as he, and lent their joint projects moral fervour. The only difference was in tone. Evatt sounded and acted like the self-conscious leader of a brash and irreverent new country ; in one of the most celebrated of his remarks he said 'I like all Americans except the State Department.'

The Trusteeship Committee met two or three times a week — scheduled so as to fit in with other committee meetings. Its agenda (which I prepared under the chairman's nominal supervision) was usually formal : we simply went on with the discussions before us, and considered the motions and the documents presented from the floor or given to me between meetings. Our chief document was the set of proposals handed in on behalf of the United States but including the decisions of the Five-Power conferees. By and large we had a lot of documentation, which the conference documents unit processed, which was put in each delegation's mail early each morning, and which my assistants supplied in large numbers at the actual meetings. Fraser was always prepared, in that he was familiar with the documents, but like most other delegates he always arrived empty-handed and expected to find a new supply of documents at his place. The 'summary reports' of the Committee meetings, which have unfortunately survived as the only official record, was prepared by my staff : he gave a blanket approval in advance. It was a description in a very few pages of the proposals and actions taken. It should have been dispassionate, since it was drafted by my two senior assistants, an English man and an American woman, who frequently disagreed and were likely to cast their sentences accordingly.

Fraser was a very fine chairman. He had only two weaknesses. One was his complete ignorance of any language but his own, in a committee on which Latin Americans took a great interest and seldom spoke in English, and on which the French delegates always spoke French. We had assigned to us the best conference interpreters, but they always lose certain nuances, and of course gave their interpretation after the original speech was made. Fraser carried out religiously the conference agreement not to discuss territories, and again and again called to order Mr. D. L. Smit of South Africa (a former Secretary of Native Affairs), who would constantly mention South-West Africa. One evening, however, we all listened with a sort of embarrassed delight while a Latin American, speaking in Spanish, expressed eloquently the position of his country about various areas. When the interpreter got up to repeat this in English, Fraser flew out at the interpreter and cut him short.

Fraser's lack of adeptness in languages was amusingly illustrated in the drafting sub-committee which from time to time met to redraft the proposals adopted by the full committee, and incidentally to provide, or try to provide, a French text which would mean the same as the English text. The first meeting of the sub-committee was presided over by Mr. LeGallais the rapporteur, whose English and French were as good as his German, and who was able to keep English and French-speaking delegates in line. Fraser insisted on coming to other meetings, were of course he presided. With some difficulty experts in drafting got him to accept a satisfactory English draft, but the French speakers talked to each other at one end of the table, and I found myself listening to one language with one ear and one with the other. My final solution was to work out a French text myself with the help of very able State Department translators and French-speaking delegates. Unlike some committees we adopted both an English and a French text, though we used English as the working language. Unfortunately my efforts were rendered useless by a political intervention, and the chapters we drafted are the only parts of the Charter where there is a definite (though not too significant) divergence in meaning between the French and the English versions.

The other weakness was a tendency to treat the Committee like the New Zealand Parliament, and to cajole and even bully it. This, however, he always made amends for by a cordial affability. It is part of the business of the secretary to sit next to the chairman and keep him straight. Fraser sometimes consulted me before the meeting. During the meeting he never read notes I prepared and handed him.

Sometimes when I was appalled at what he was doing I would try to shout at him in a whisper, but never with any result except that I would get red in the face and he redder.

But they liked him. He was honest, always on the job, had a splendid presence, a voice that carried, and the habit of command. He was also very experienced as a presiding officer. Furthermore, though he was used to dominating, he was a politician accustomed to hearing opinions he disliked, and willing to accept the sense of the meeting even if he did not quite agree with it. The more radical members of the Committee – such as the Arab *bloc* – looked upon him as a reactionary, essentially a tool of the United States and the United Kingdom. The rest of us, though we saw his limitations, admired him.

And he knew how to handle himself in public. I attended him at the two press conferences he gave early in the Conference, in the auditorium of the Veteran's Buildings. He faced fifty shrewd reporters, some of whom I knew from experience were hard to baffle. Mr. Fraser addressed them eloquently for half an hour and answered questions freely. But they learned no secrets from him.

Fraser never failed to attend the Committee's meetings. Though our meetings were long and tiring, and he was not young, he took them well. All in all he was perhaps the best chairman of the Conference. He illustrated the special capacity for such work that in those days was legitimately ascribed to political leaders of the English-speaking democracies. New Zealand was the more important in the Conference because Fraser represented it.

Under the direction of Fraser, certainly in part owing to his chairmanship, the Trusteeship Committee made an unusually large contribution to the Charter, and one which had not been guaranteed in advance. It produced no less than three chapters of the Charter. It invented a 'principal organ' of the United Nations, the Trusteeship Council. It established the trusteeship system. It set standards for the administration of non-self-governing territories which New Zealand has been one of the most zealous of nations to accept. And it laid the Charter basis for the South Pacific Commission.

The correct and friendly relationship between the chairman and the secretary of the Committee never became one of personal friendship, as sometimes happens. I became quite good friends with some of the young New Zealanders. But outside of office and the committee-room and such official meetings as attendance at the Co-ordination Committee and the Commission meetings, I was almost never asked to attend the Prime Minister. He invited me to a very large reception given by the New Zealand delegation where two bands played and he introduced me to General Smuts. But he showed no unofficial cordiality as did other delegates, quite harmlessly. When on return from San Francisco, secretaries of committees were exchanging experiences, and I was asked what Fraser had given me as a present, I replied 'Nothing.' It had not occurred to me otherwise, though I quite understood that my friends who 'worked' for Middle Eastern or Latin American chairmen might be handsomely remembered.

Fraser was an individual, and properly so, and a very individualistic Prime Minister. I remember the one occasion when we lost him. Commission II to which our Committee reported – though only in the most formal way – held its meetings to receive our report one evening, late in the session, in the Opera House, with General Smuts in the chair, the officers of the Committee on the platform, the delegations in their official places, and a huge audience. The meeting consisted largely of speeches by Lord Cranborne (now the Marquess of Salisbury) for the United Kingdom, General Romulo for the Philippines, and so on. When the moment for the beginning arrived, the Prime Minister was missing. This was technically my responsibility, as secretary. It was from the New Zealand point of view the responsibility of Mr. McIntosh. The latter explained that, knowing Fraser's unpredictability, he had seen him through dinner and into his own car and had then himself got into another New Zealand car. He started for the Opera House, believing that Fraser followed. We both felt abashed. I could not discover the Prime Minister by telephone anywhere. He finally arrived, twenty minutes late.

I remember also one day when I went to see him at his hotel to find out what the Committee was to do. It was during the crisis when Russian intransigence as to the extent of the veto had held up action until a message could go – 'by donkey cart', as we said – to Moscow and return. Fraser was seated at a desk covered with papers bearing on New Zealand affairs. It was the only time I saw him discouraged. 'My parliament has met,' he said. 'I should be at home. But how can I face the people who sent me here unless I bring back the Charter with me?'

He stayed. The Charter was completed and signed. In the creation of the Charter he played a far larger part than most men in San Francisco, for he demanded the right things, he set the right tone, and he persisted until the work was done.

Seato and Subversion

M. MARGARET BALL

In signing the Manila Treaty in 1954, the SEATO powers recognised the danger of indirect aggression – via subversion – as well as the possibility of armed attack. SEATO was designed to guard against an expansion of Communism by either method, although the Treaty was phrased in general terms and the only formal reference to Communism appears in the United States' 'understanding' inserted just before the signatures.[1] In 1954, armed attack was considered a real danger. Since then, Communist tactics have undergone much the same modifications in Southeast Asia as in other areas. With the new Soviet emphasis on peaceful coexistence, the possibility of armed attack has become more remote. In consequence, for the past several years, while denying that the military threat has ceased to exist, the SEATO Council has considered that it is outweighed in importance by the danger from subversion. Thus in the communiqué issued March 13, 1958, the Council reiterated the necessity of maintaining a satisfactory defence posture, but recognised that Communist subversion 'represented the most substantial current menace'.[2] This evaluation has been concurred in by a number of well-informed, if unofficial, sources.[3] Under these circumstances, it is perhaps desirable to examine the SEATO approach to what its members now regard as the greater danger.

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[1] This is the statement that the commitment of Article IV (1) referring to armed attack will bind the United States only in case the attack is of Communist origin. The general terms in which the Treaty commitment is embodied represented in part a concession to those states, including Pakistan, that wanted a guarantee against attack from whatever source. In part, however, it represented an effort not to alienate the so-called 'uncommitted' countries of the area who it was hoped might eventually join the association.

[2] 'Fourth Meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXVIII (March 31, 1958), 504. Mr. Casey, Australian Minister for External Affairs, was of this view as early as 1954. In his speech on ratification of the South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, October 27, 1954, he stated: 'The Australian Government regards the danger from communist subversive activities as a greater immediate problem than the danger of open communist aggression.' ([Australia, Department of External Affairs], 'Second Reading Speech by the Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs, on the Bill to Ratify the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. Wednesday, October 27th, 1954.' [11 pp., mimeographed], p. 10.)

[3] See, for example, Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Collective Defence in South East Asia* (London, 1956), p. 143; see also pp. 58-60.

In the absence of a Treaty definition, one may well begin by inquiring what is covered by the term 'subversion'. In his recent 'Political Re-examination of SEATO',[4] Professor W. Macmahon Ball suggests a distinction between internal subversion and subversion from without. In the first category he includes armed insurrection, other forms of pressure such as strikes and political demonstrations, and persuasion designed to develop popular support. In the second category he puts efforts to detach frontier areas, the smuggling of supplies to disaffected groups, radio propaganda, and the like. Communist techniques delineated by SEATO officials include the infiltration of unions, youth groups and cultural organisations; efforts to legalise the Communist party where it is outlawed and attempts to bring the Communists into coalition governments where it is legal; pressures on Chinese and other minority groups; economic penetration; and radio propaganda.[5] Whether or not one agrees with the broad definition of subversion implied in the foregoing, it is clear that two elements are involved in the highly varied activities listed: an active element comprising those who would subvert others, and a more or less passive element – what might be called 'potential subvertees'. SEATO is concerned with both. It desires not only to restrict the activities of the subverters but also to decrease the receptiveness of potential subvertees to the blandishments of those attempting to further Communist ends. The problem of subverters can be attacked fairly directly; the approach to the problem of potential subvertees has involved not only counter-subversion programmes but also general cultural and economic programmes.

SEATO'S authority to deal with subversion derives primarily from two articles of the Manila Treaty. Article II provides for mutual aid not only to increase the defence capacities of the parties but also to 'prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability'. Article IV (2) covers the 'designated' states of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam as well as the SEATO members and provides that:

> If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to

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[4] *International Organization*, XII (Winter, 1958), 22.

[5] See *S.E.A.T.O., The Second Year, 1956-1957* (SCR/57/Rep-P; press release of March 5, 1957), pp. 4-5, and 'Development of SEATO in Its Third Year; Report by Pote Sarasin, Secretary General of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXVIII (March 31, 1958), 511.

> which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

While Article II refers only to 'subversion directed from without', Article IV (2) covers internal subversion as well. Neither Article is couched in terms of Communist subversion, of course, but Communist subversion was, and remains, the principal issue. The United States, it may be noted in passing, is fully bound by the provisions of Article II and Article IV (2) ; the 'understanding' referred to above limits American liability only in the event of armed attack under Article IV (1).[6]

A number of SEATO's critics have felt that the Treaty provisions relating to subversion could be used (or were being used) to uphold undemocratic regimes in the SEATO countries in the face of attacks by purely domestic, non-Communist, opposition groups.[7] The conference of the Australian Labour Party declared on March 13, 1957, for example : 'This conference is of the opinion that SEATO has failed to perform its basic functions, that it is fast becoming an instrument for bolstering reactionary regimes as in Siam. . . .' The conference further declared that 'we are of the opinion that the bolstering of reactionary regimes in South-East Asia, such as that in Siam, merely assists the Communists by giving them the opportunity to take over genuinely democratic nationalist movements'.[8] Faced at the Senate hearing of November 11, 1954, with the direct question whether the Manila Treaty commits the United States to help put down domestic revolutionary movements, Secretary Dulles replied categorically: 'No. If there is a revolutionary movement in Vietnam or in Thailand, we would consult together as to what to do about it, because if that were a subversive movement that was in fact propagated by communism, it would be a very grave threat to us. But we have no undertaking to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult together as to what to do about it.'[9] In short, the commitment under Article IV (2) is simply to consult. It should be noted, moreover, that Article IV (3) provides that no action shall be taken on the territory of the designated states of Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam except by invitation, or with the consent, of their governments.

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[6] The 'understanding' provides, textually: 'The United States of America in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to Communist aggression, but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.'

[7] This point was raised by Senator Watkins in the hearings on the Treaty held by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and some concern was also expressed in the parliaments of Australia and the United Kingdom. See Ralph Braibanti, *International Implications of the Manila Pact;* Paper prepared for the Thirteenth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Lahore, Pakistan, February 3-14, 1958 (New York: American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1958), pp. 14-15.

[8] *The Sydney Times Herald,* March 14, 1957.

If there is no general duty to protect existing regimes, is there nonetheless a likelihood that SEATO will intervene gratuitously to preserve non-democratic regimes in the event of insurgency? Several points should be kept in mind in this connection. While the Treaty does not specify that decisions reached by consultation must be unanimous, the practice thus far has been to act by general agreement rather than by majority vote. In reaching a consensus, as Braibanti points out, at least the bulk of the eight members — who may have differing views on insurgent movements — must be in agreement. In addition, the Commonwealth members of SEATO are likely to keep in mind the attitudes of non-SEATO members of the Commonwealth in taking a position. These factors, among others, should tend to preclude precipitate action.[10] It seems unlikely, indeed, that agreement could be reached to intervene in a situation in which a domestic revolutionary group, undirected by the Communist *bloc,* should seek to overthrow an existing regime. The fact that no action was taken in the Thai *coup* by which Marshal Pibul Songgram's government was overturned in the autumn of 1957 adds weight to this view. (It should also be noted that although the Pibul government was officially in good odour with SEATO — and could take public credit for benefits received — that fact failed to save it when the chips were down.) In fact, the probable difficulties would seem to be of a different nature. One is that disagreement as to the nature of a revolutionary movement in a member or designated state (as in the case of the Lebanon in the summer of 1958), would prevent the organisation from acting at all.

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[9] United States Senate, *The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty* (83rd Cong., 2d sess.), Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive K, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., Part I, November 11, 1954 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 28.

[10] Braibanti, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

Another is that events might move so swiftly in a designated state that a pro-Communist regime would be in effective control before it could be challenged – in which case the problem would be whether SEATO would be entitled to intervene on the application of a government already overthrown, or whether it would be precluded from acting in the absence of the consent of the government in power.[11]

As to countries located within the Treaty area but which are neither members of SEATO nor designated states, subversion would seem to come within the purview of SEATO only under the terms of Article IV (2) – and then only if a Party considered the situation to endanger the peace of the area and thereby to threaten the inviolability or territorial integrity of either a Party or a designated state. In that event, the situation could give rise to consultation for the purpose of agreeing 'on the measures which should be taken for the common defense'. In the case of the rebellion in Indonesia in the early months of 1958, it was apparent that a Communist-oriented Indonesia could create a serious security problem for SEATO members. Nevertheless, the SEATO powers scrupulously refrained from aiding the anti-Communist insurgents. The problem was unquestionably discussed at length at the Fourth SEATO Council meeting, although that fact was soft-pedalled – possibly because of Secretary Dulles's view that the rebellion should be considered a purely Indonesian question.[12] The communiqué of March 13 makes no specific mention of the matter.

SEATO is directly attacking the problem of subversion on two fronts. One – aimed at the subverters – involves the identification of members of this group and their activities and efforts to enhance intergovernmental co-operation for their suppression. The other – directed at potential subvertees – comprises an 'exposure' programme designed to call the attention of SEATO populations to the nature, objectives, and techniques of the Communists in an effort to develop a greater measure of political sophistication.

SEATO recognises that the control of subversive activities is the responsibility of the member governments in the first instance. It has thus encouraged bilateral measures – police co-operation with respect to known agents and saboteurs, mutual aid in the training of security forces, and co-operation with respect to border controls.[13] At the same time, SEATO has made its own contribution to the identification of subversive activities both through its Committee of Security Experts and the Research Service Centre of the Secretariat. The Committee consists of experts on subversion in the member governments, meets several times a year, and makes recommendations to the Council and the governments on the nature of the Communist threat and ways of meeting it. It also serves as a channel for intergovernmental exchange of views.[14] The Research Service Centre prepares reports on Communist activities for circulation to the governments, and provides material for the public relations people in connection with the exposure programme.

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[11] On this point, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, op. cit., p. 14.

[12] Secretary Dulles, at his news conference of May 20, 1958, stated: '. . . the United States believes that the situation in Indonesia can be and should be dealt with as an Indonesian problem.' ('Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 20', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXVIII [June 9, 1958], 945-46.)

[13] See *S.E.A.T.O., The Second Year*, op. cit., p. 6.

As indicated by the communiqué issued at the end of the Third Council meeting (Canberra, 1957), exposure is regarded as an essential part of the campaign against subversion :

> Believing that public knowledge of these tactics – of how and where subversion is occurring – is an essential prerequisite of action against them, the Council agreed to direct its civil organization to intensify its work of identifying all phases of subversive tactics ; to make known its findings amongst member governments ; and to expose them to the scrutiny of public opinion.[15]

The SEATO Secretariat and the governments co-operate closely on the exposure programme. The Research Service Centre provides some of the background material. SEATO's Public Relations Office, with the aid of some of the national information services, prepares material for publication. National information services assist with publication and have the principal responsibility for distribution. In 1957, twenty-four publications were issued – in English, Thai, Urdu, and Bengali.[16] Ten radio programmes were provided for the use of members. One documentary film, 'Operation Albatross',[17] (made with the co-operation of the United States Information Service) was completed and two more documentaries were being prepared (one by USIS and one by the New Zealand National Film Unit).18 In 1957, too, a four-day seminar on counter-subversion was held at Baguio. Participants included 'officials, educators, publicists, leaders of public opinion, trade union leaders' and others from the member countries. The objectives were 'to focus appropriate public attention on the nature and extent of Communist subversion . . . and . . . to assist in the general SEATO effort to expose and counter Communist attempts to extend their power and influence in the treaty area'.19

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[14] See 'First Annual Report of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXIV (March 12, 1956), 406; *S.E.A.T.O., The Second Year*, op. cit., p. 6; 'Second Meeting of SEATO Council', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXIV (March 19, 1954), 448; and 'Development of SEATO in its Third Year', op. cit., p. 514.

[15] Communiqué of March 13, in 'Third Meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXVI (April 1, 1957), 528.

[16] These publications had a distribution of over a million copies.

[17] The ect is the military exercises of 1956.

The foregoing, then, represent the direct efforts to counter Communist subversion. Of these efforts, probably the most successful is that represented by various forms of police co-operation. Although most of this work is secret, the governments appear to feel satisfied with the degree of co-operation which has been achieved. The exposure programme is inherently a good deal more difficult to implement satisfactorily. It is largely directed at Asians who have had little experience with either democracy or Communism and who may be said to be politically illiterate. The problem here is to 'educate' them on the evils of Communism without arousing a curiosity which might backfire into a rejection of democracy — a far from easy task.

The battle for the allegiance of the people of Southeast Asia (including potential subvertees) involves a good deal more than these direct efforts to counter subversion. A cultural programme involving scholarships, fellowships, professorial appointments, and round-table discussions reaches some of the leaders and potential leaders of the Asian SEATO members.20 But ideology in the abstract tends to be less important to peoples who have enjoyed few of either the political or economic benefits of freedom than more mundane considerations — particularly when the threat of military aggression is widely thought to be virtually non-existent. The strength of the new nationalism, the belief that industrialisation is a prerequisite to national strength and

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18 See 'Development of SEATO in Its Third Year', op. cit., p. 515.

19 Final communiqué: 'SEATO Seminar Completes Study of Communist Threat', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXVII (December 23, 1957), 993. Bilateral activity has also occurred. The U.S. and Pibul governments sent out teams to various parts of Thailand for the purpose of instructing the peasants on the general subject of Communism. (Amry Vandenbosch and Richard A. Butwell, *Southeast Asia Among the World Powers* [Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1957], p. 180.)

20 See 'Development of SEATO in Its Third Year', op. cit., pp. 513, 515, and 'Fourth Meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization', op. cit., p. 505.

dignity, place a premium on economic development. The Southeast Asian nations, among them the Asian SEATO members, are, of course, among the under-developed countries avid for help. They are beneficiaries of the United Nations technical assistance programme; they are participants in the Colombo Plan; and many of them are recipients of substantial aid under national programmes. But the available sums are never sufficient to cover the costs of programmes they would like to undertake.

The Communist *bloc* benefits from this situation both by the force of example and as a potential donor. It is clear that both Russia and China have achieved much in the direction of economic development by their own efforts. This is an attractive example to many Asians, particularly since the cost – in terms of individual liberty – is largely an unknown or disregarded quantity. Communist *bloc* foreign aid policy is also attractive, especially since a great point has been made of the fact that aid is offered without political strings. The new Communist economic competition, in sum, presents the SEATO nations with new problems in their efforts to hold the allegiance of Southeast Asia.[21]

The Asian SEATO members have not been among the recipients of development loans from the Soviet *bloc*, although one of the designated states, Cambodia, has received aid from that source, as

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[21] Figures published by the U.S. Department of State in March 1958 give a comparison of Sino-Soviet and U.S. *economic* assistance extended the countries of Southeast Asia between July 1, 1955, and February 1, 1958 (in millions of dollars):—

	ICA OBLIGATIONS	OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT	TOTAL U.S.	TOTAL SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Burma	25	18	43	42
Cambodia	94	2	96	22
Indonesia	27	97	124	109
Pakistan	204	68	272	—
Philippines	63	72	135	—
Thailand	73	2	75	—

('Economic Activities of the Soviet Bloc in Less Developed Countries; Statement by Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXVIII [March 24, 1958], 473.) These figures, of course, do not include the credit of $125 million made available by the United States to the Philippines in June 1958. (*New York Herald Tribune*, June 21, 1958.) Among the nations of the Treaty area for which the U.S. Administration requested appropriations for defence support in fiscal year 1959 were Cambodia, Laos, Philippines, and Thailand. (United States Senate, *Mutual Security Act of 1958* [85th Cong., 2d sess.], *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3318* [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958], p. 336).

have Burma and Indonesia. On the other hand, pressure from the Asian members to expand SEATO's economic programme has increased.

The non-Asian SEATO governments have tended to take a more limited view of the functions to be carried out under Article III of the Treaty than have the Asians.[22] While these governments have felt that Communist propaganda might be less effective if living standards could be raised, they have also considered that the economic problems of the Asian SEATO members must be treated as part of those of a larger area.[23] They have therefore been reluctant to give SEATO responsibility for operating programmes, and have maintained that aid for economic development should be channelled through organisations of larger membership. The United States made it clear in 1954 that the Manila Treaty did not commit it to support a SEATO grants programme,[24] and in 1958 continued to believe that bilateral arrangements, United Nations agencies, and the Colombo Plan were to be preferred as instrumentalities for dealing with economic problems.[25] Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have felt strongly that the Colombo Plan should not be undermined by a SEATO economic programme.[26] This led to the natural conclusion on the part of the countries indicated that SEATO should be restricted in the economic field largely to problems related to the defence effort.

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[22] Art. III reads: 'The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to co-operate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.'

[23] Mr. Dulles, for instance, stated in his opening remarks at the Manila Conference of 1954: 'The opportunities of communism will diminish if trade relationships help the free nations to strengthen their economies. This will require the participation of countries additional to those who are particularly concerned with the security of Southeast Asia. Economic planning, to be adequate, must stimulate trade not only within the Southeast Asia area but also between that area and South Asia and the West Pacific. Such planning is obviously beyond the scope of this Conference. But this Conference would not do its duty toward the many who place hope in us if we did not leave here with a well-conceived resolve to unite our efforts with those of others to make the free countries of this area stronger and more vigorous, not only militarily, but also socially and economically.' ('Collective Defense for Southeast Asia', *Department of State Bulletin, XXXI* [September 20, 1954], 391-92.)

[24] See 'Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and Protocol Transmitted to Senate', *Department of State Bulletin,* XXXI (November 29, 1954), 821, and Mr. Dulles' statement at the Senate hearing on the Manila Treaty, in United States Senate, *The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,* op. cit., p. 14.

25-26 See page 34.

This difference of view between Asian and most of the non-Asian members has been reflected in the four Council meetings held thus far. At the first meeting of the SEATO Council (Bangkok, 1955), it was agreed that while many matters (trade, payments, economic development, investment, etc.) should be handled on a wider basis than SEATO afforded, 'nevertheless special economic questions arise out of the Treaty commitments of the member governments and may involve individual and co-operative steps which member states could take to resolve these questions'.[27] A Committee of Economic Experts was created to advise the Council on matters of this nature, and began to devote itself to 'special economic questions arising out of the Treaty commitments of the members, such as the impact of defense costs on national economies'.[28]

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25. Thus Mr. Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, 1958: 'In the main, I do not think that these organizations, NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, themselves provide the best mechanisms for dealing with this economic trouble. The other mechanisms that exist — bilateral assistance, loans through the Export-Import Bank or through the Development Loan Fund, loans through the World Bank, some of the activities of the United Nations in the field of technical co-operation and the like, the Colombo plan — there are a number of mechanisms of this sort for providing assistance. I do not think necessarily these collective defense organizations are the best mechanism for diverting economic assistance from present channels into these regional organizations as a new channel.' (United States Senate, *Mutual Security Act of 1958*, op. cit., p. 175.)

26 See the opening remarks by the Australian Minister of External Affairs at the Manila Conference, in *The Signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Pacific Charter* (Manila, September 8, 1954), p. 25; the 'Second Reading Speech by the Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey', op. cit., p. 7; and [Australia, Department of External Affairs], 'Speech in the House of Representatives by Mr. R. G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs — Tuesday, 2nd April, 1957 (20 pp., multigraphed), pp. 18-19. See also the statement of the New Zealand Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Webb, of September 30, 1954, in presenting the Manila Treaty to the House of Representatives: 'There is no intention at present to use Seato as the medium through which this economic and technical assistance will be provided. It could be done through Seato, but so far as New Zealand at any rate is concerned there is no purpose in resorting to that channel when we already have the Colombo Plan.' (New Zealand, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates* [Fifth Session, Thirteenth Parliament], Vol. 304 [Wellington, 1955], p. 2102.) Further documentation on this point may be found in Braibanti, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

27 Final communiqué, in 'Results of Meeting of Council of Southeast Asia Pact', *Department of State Bulletin*, XXXII (March 7, 1955), 372.

28 'First Annual Report of the Council Representatives of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization', op. cit., p. 406.

Asian interest in SEATO economic development was clearly manifested at the second meeting of the SEATO Council (Karachi, 1956).[29] The Council reviewed the economic progress of the Treaty area, including progress made under bilateral and other non-SEATO programmes. The Council's instructions to the Committee of Economic Experts, however, indicated that the Committee's work should continue to focus on 'the study of the concrete problems resulting from the defense effort of member states as well as those existing in areas particularly susceptible to subversive activities'.[30] The Asian desire for additional aid was met in part, however, by an Australian offer of £A2 million for defence support, or what Mr. Casey at the time called 'twilight aid'.[31] On April 2, 1957, Mr. Casey made it clear that some of this aid was available for use 'for agreed programmes (including multilateral programmes) that may emerge from SEATO studies',[32] while the rest was being offered individual countries on request. (It should be remarked that in all cases, the actual administration of grants has been based on bilateral agreement. The Australian government does not intend to turn over sums for SEATO distribution any more than does the United States.) In making the new fund available, Australia was influenced by SEATO studies of the resources and deficiencies of the Asian SEATO members in relation to defence. The offer arose specifically out of a SEATO need, and was designed to fulfil a SEATO purpose. It was consistent with the Australian belief that SEATO 'can help in assessing the economic and industrial capacity of member countries and what they need to make their different programmes effective. This can open the way to some mutual aid to help member nations support the burdens they have undertaken for their own and common defense.'[33]

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[29] See *Dawn* (Karachi), March 3, 1956, and reports of the opening statements of the delegates of Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines as reported in *The New York Times*, March 7, 1956.

[30] Communiqué of March 8, in 'Second Meeting of SEATO Council', op. cit., p. 448.

[31] On October 9, 1956, Mr. Casey explained to the Australian Parliament that what was involved was 'aid that was intermediate between normal civil aid such as we give under the Colombo plan on the one hand and what might be called shooting weapons and ammunition on the other hand. At the time I gave instances of such items as defence mechanical equipment, trucks and, maybe, bulldozers, and other forms of equipment used by the fighting services, cloths for uniforms, tinned food-stuffs, training of those countries' officers and non-commissioned officers in Australia, communications equipment, and a wide range of other equipment. . . .' (Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates* [Daily Report], October 9, 1956, col. 1283.)

[32] 'Speech in the House of Representatives', op. cit., p. 19.

Asian pressure for an expansion of SEATO economic activity continued at the Third Council meeting (Canberra, 1957). The Council again reviewed progress under non-SEATO programmes. Mr. Dulles, more or less following the earlier Australian lead, suggested that the Committee of Economic Experts might wish to suggest projects from which two or more countries would benefit for consideration in connection with the American Asian Development Fund. The final communiqué indicated that the Council had discussed 'what were the most appropriate arrangements' by which the economic problems of the Asians 'requiring co-operative action with other members . . . might be resolved'. More important, perhaps, it indicated that 'SEATO Expert Committees have recommended specific projects to assist in relieving the economic burden of defense and to make a contribution towards the continuation of economic development under SEATO's protective shield. Council members undertook to consider the carrying out of these recommendations.'[34] Whether this meant that SEATO economic functions were to be materially expanded remained a matter of some doubt; some of the Asian countries appeared to feel that this was the case; some of the non-Asian members evidently did not.

The latter interpretation proved to be the more accurate. At the Fourth Council meeting (Manila, 1958), the Australian government announced an addition of £A1 million to its former grant; the United States agreed to provide $2 million for vocational and in-service training; Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom agreed to help train skilled labour for the Asian members; and the Council approved a Thai proposal to establish a SEATO Graduate School of Engineering at Bangkok to the expenses of which several other members offered to contribute. Nevertheless, the emphasis as regards economic aid continued to be on bilateral and non-SEATO multilateral programmes. The Council reiterated that 'a principal means of attaining [the economic objectives of the Manila Treaty] continues to be through extensive bilateral and other economic arrangements between the SEATO countries'.[35]

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[33] *Ibid.*

[34] 'Third Meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization', op. cit., p. 528.

During the past four years, then, direct SEATO economic activities have been confined rather closely to matters relating to the improvement of the defence capacities of the member countries. This is not as restrictive a policy, however, as it might appear to be. For example, SEATO has done important work in the matter of skilled labour. While the point of departure of the Committee of Economic Experts was the problem of skilled labour in defence industries, it is obvious that the action taken during and after 1957 to establish training programmes designed to improve the supply of skilled labour will have a lasting impact on the economic development of the Asian SEATO members. There is reason to believe, moreover, that discussions within SEATO have served indirectly to influence bilateral aid and technical assistance programmes in useful ways, and possibly also – although this is debatable – to increase the total supply of aid.

The existing limitations on the SEATO programme make sense both economically and administratively. There are only three Asian SEATO members. They are separated from each other geographically and their economies are competitive rather than complementary. Clearly little can be done through SEATO to expand their mutual trade. For SEATO to enter the economic development field in any major way would be to augment a duplication of activity which, from a purely administrative standpoint, would be lamentable. Another obstacle, of course, is the reluctance of the American Congress (and perhaps of other governments) to transfer the allocation of funds to an international organisation which it cannot control.

But do these limitations make as much sense politically as they do economically and administratively, assuming that an important objective of the programme – whatever its extent – is to cement the allegiance of countries of the treaty area to the democratic world? Or should the economic and administrative arguments against an enlarged SEATO programme be disregarded and the programme materially enlarged? That the Asian governments have felt an obligation to show something by way of economic benefit to their populations to justify the political and military commitments they have undertaken, is clear. An effort has been made to meet this domestic political need by giving publicity to aid which has been extended by other SEATO members, regardless of the programme (Colombo Plan or other) under which the assistance has been rendered. The SEATO ' label ' has been pinned on a good deal of this assistance. Thus the Secretary General's report on SEATO's third year catalogues assistance given the Asian members and the designated states by Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, and the United States.[36] It is impossible to measure the success of this technique with any degree of accuracy. That it is not altogether successful, however, is indicated by frequent complaints that the neutrals receive as much or more than countries committed to the West. The legitimacy of these complaints is more or less irrelevant for present purposes. The fact of their existence shows that the desired effect has not been wholly attained.

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[35] Communiqué of March 13, 1958, in 'Fourth Meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization', op. cit., p. 505. The communiqué mentioned $700 million furnished in 1957 for economic purposes for the countries covered by the Manila Treaty (principally by the United States).

Does this mean that the SEATO economic programme should be enlarged in the interest of promoting a more favourable public opinion in the Asian countries? Apart from the economic and administrative arguments against such a course is the fact that if the chief problem is the amount of aid given by the West to committed as compared with uncommitted states, it could presumably be solved either by increasing, or by giving better publicity to existing, programmes from which the Asian SEATO members profit. A further point of importance is the fact that insofar as economic programmes are designed to decrease the possibility of governmental overturn by non-democratic forces, this is something which is of interest as regards *all* of the nations of South and Southeast Asia. Just as the economic problems of the area are wider than SEATO membership, so is the basic political problem. In these circumstances, the non-Asian SEATO members must carefully balance their aid programmes in the interest of promoting the stability of the entire area. It may be that the United States and its occidental friends would be well advised to augment the amount of available development capital by a very substantial amount. If so, however, the political objective would indicate that this should not be done exclusively for the benefit of the Asian SEATO members. This, in turn, implies that the organisational channels should also be other than SEATO.

This does not mean, of course, that no economic benefit should accrue to our SEATO allies. It does suggest that it is legitimate to relate the organisation's own programme to its defensive purpose. At the same time, the Australian example in the matter of ' twilight aid ' might well be followed by other potential donors both because it gives the organisation a part in determining the needs to be met and because it provides a flexible approach to problems of major concern to the Asian members. As to the public relations side of the question, it would seem that the publicity given both SEATO's own activities and aid received from other SEATO members should be increased. The current SEATO ' labelling ' technique is good ; to give additional popular currency to this aid would be even better.

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[36] ' Development of SEATO in Its Third Year ', op. cit., p. 512.

There are obviously other facets of policy which are likely to affect SEATO's ability to offset Communist subversion. Not least of these is the readiness of the Western members to operate on democratic principles in their relations with the Asian states. And it is more than doubtful that anti-subversion activities, direct or indirect, can hold the Asian SEATO powers or other Asian states to either a pro-Western or a neutral orientation if they have reason to believe that the West seeks to maintain in power governments which they regard as undemocratic, or to resist Communist encroachment only for its own benefit. A recognition of community of interest must underlie any successful SEATO programme.

Independence and Instability in Indonesia [1]

LESLIE H. PALMIER

On August 17, 1945, two Indonesians, Sukarno and Hatta, signed a declaration of independence in what was then Batavia. From this event dates the beginning of Indonesian independence. This was something new. Parts of Indonesia had been free of outside control before, but never a united Indonesia. The consequences of independence have proved important not only to the Indonesians themselves but also to the world at large. They were, however, largely inherent in the situation at the time of the declaration, and followed from the same factors as made independence possible.

The early nationalist movement, that is before 1912, was cultural in character; its aim was not independence but simply the modernisation of Indonesia to make it a partner of the Netherlands. The movement was led by members of the Javanese nobility (in whose hands lay local government) who had acquired a western education and wished to see its benefits spread more widely. However, they soon lost ground to people with different ideas. In 1912 the Sarikat Islam was founded. It began as a guild of cloth manufacturers, formed primarily to combat the Chinese monopoly in the trade, but soon developed a demand for the changing of the colonial conditions which permitted the monopoly to exist, and as its aims altered so it was joined by other nationalist parties. These were not drawn from the trading classes, but rather from intellectual groups which had emerged from the nobility.

The processes which led to this development merit some attention. From the beginning of the century, at least, educational facilities had been provided for a much larger number of people than previously. Unfortunately, the Dutch did not, for one reason or another, provide occupational positions consonant with the education of those trained. As a result, the second and third decades of this century were politically the most troubled in Netherlands Indies history, despite the fact that the twenties saw the most spectacular economic growth the country has ever known.[2]

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[1] The substance of an address given on May 20, 1958, to the Social Science Section of the Royal Society of New Zealand, Wellington Branch.

Several nationalist parties were formed by these educated Javanese; with the polarisation of attitudes in the twenties only two attracted large-scale support. Both demanded complete independence. One was led by Sukarno, the other by Hatta and Sjahrir. These two parties never saw eye to eye, and differed both in their outlook and their structure. Sukarno's more extreme party advocated non-co-operation and was composed of a mass following with a very small leadership. Hatta and Sjahrir's party, on the other hand, was based upon the principle of what one might call educated dedication. It insisted that all its members be well trained and know both the principles for which they stood and their part in the organisation. Each of these parties had its strengths and its weaknesses. Sukarno's party dissolved the moment he and his fellow leaders were removed by the Indies government. Hatta and Sjahrir's party, however, was able to continue without them.[3] At the same time, it was never able to attract mass support.

The Sarikat Islam at first contained a number of left-wing elements. These were forced out, and formed what became the Communist party. In 1926 it launched a revolt against the Dutch which was suppressed without difficulty. The main sufferers were the Indonesian people. The Dutch lost patience with the idea of nationalism and some years later Sukarno, Hatta and Sjahrir were arrested and placed in an exile from which only Japanese invasion released them.

Throughout this period nationalist activity was centred in Java. The outer islands were less developed and had few educated people. Consequently those nationalists who come from there were schooled either in Java or, more rarely, in Holland. The nationalist movement was thus an amalgam of several discrete entities whose interests often diverged in all respects but one: the removal of the governing Dutch élite. There were traders and officials (the latter were both aristocrats and non-aristocrats); there were Javanese and non-Javanese; there were Communists and non-Communists.

The Japanese invasion and occupation proved to be a godsend to the nationalist movement.[4] The leaders were given official positions and eventually allowed to have greater access to the people than ever before. Many officials were raised to the senior ranks from which the Japanese had ejected the Dutch, and many new civil servants were recruited. The Japanese also recognised, and raised the status of, Muslim religious and political leaders. (Even under the Dutch it had been they, and not the secular nationalists, who had had most contact with the peasant masses.) Last, but far from least, the Japanese trained an armed force which provided commissions for many Muslims and members of the nobility. Indonesian leaders of all types of groups thereby acquired a vested interest in resisting the re-imposition of Dutch rule. When Japan collapsed the nationalists found themselves with an aroused population, a bureaucracy devoted to their interests, and the nucleus of an army. Fortune favoured them yet further. There was a gap of a few months before the arrival in Java of British troops to whom the Japanese were to surrender. This gave the nationalists sufficient time to organise an embryonic state. The British on arrival had to co-operate with it ; they thereby accorded the Republic of Indonesia *de facto* recognition.

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[2] Cf. J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands Indies*, Cambridge 1944, 250-55, 303-45.

[3] G. McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Ithaca 1952, p. 93.

[4] Cf. Kahin, op. cit., pp. 101-46; H. J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, The Hague, etc., 1958, pp. 103-94.

The proclamation of independence signalled the beginning of a struggle with the Dutch in which, it must be said, the latter showed the bad faith which has made it easy to portray them as bogymen in the years since. The Republic at the same time had to cope with internal struggles for power. Two left-wing revolts in 1946 and 1948 (the latter Communist) were tests from which the Republic emerged, if not triumphant, at least alive. The Dutch meanwhile were engaged upon setting up several states in the archipelago, which they then formed into a federation. In 1949, when the Dutch agreed to withdraw, they handed over sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Unfortunately, the Javanese intellectuals' fear that they might have to surrender some power to the constituent states, and the odium in which which the Dutch were generally held, combined to kill the federation. In 1950 Indonesia emerged as an unitary state.

Since then the country has been plagued by disturbances. Unlike France, this does not merely mean that the cabinet is unsteady, whilst neither parliament nor the country are. Indonesia is unstable in the sense that doubts consistently recur that she will be able to retain her present form, or even continue to embrace her present area.

Barely had the state got under way, when one Muslim leader of the fight for independence raised the standard of revolt in West Java, declaring that he stood for an Islamic state to be known as Dar-ul-Islam. His example was followed a couple of years later by another prominent fighter in the nationalist struggle in South Celebes. In 1950, some Ambonese attempted to set up an independent Republic of the South Moluccas. In October 1952 a number of military officers tried to force a *coup d'état* and have parliament dissolved. Very shortly after, a number of seconds-in-command in various parts of Indonesia deposed their superiors. In 1953 the Atjehnese revolted. In December 1956, the army commanders in North, Central and South Sumatra declared their autonomy from the cabinet at Jakarta. In March 1957, North Celebes did the same. Within the government itself, although the changes of cabinet have not been as frequent as those in France, political life has been characterised by constant internecine warfare and an absence of any determined attack upon the country's problems.

Today, Dar-ul-Islam in West Java and in South Celebes remains as strong as ever, if not stronger. It wages guerilla warfare, and controls definite areas. The Republic of the Southern Moluccas has been crushed by military action. The Atjehnese, whom it had taken the Dutch thirty years to subdue, remained unsubdued by the Indonesian army. In 1957, finally, the central government accepted their demands and they abandoned their aim to become an Islamic state. North Sumatra returned to loyalty after a counter-coup. Central Sumatra and North Celebes became the basis for an alternative government in Indonesia. It was soon destroyed by the army. The end of the South Sumatra movement for autonomy and independent trade took place without attracting much notice.

In analysing this pattern of governmental weakness it is perhaps wisest to begin with Java. Its inhabitants account for some 53,000,000 of Indonesia's 75,000,000 and therefore provide the greater number of people both in parliament and in the government services. Javanese society from ancient times has been hierarchical and authoritarian. This tendency has been much aggravated by the advent of western education. In the nature of things, western education was given to a minority, mostly composed of those who held positions of leadership. Hence the followers tend to follow even more blindly than before, since on many aspects of the modern world only the leader has sufficient knowledge. This, of course, is why Indonesian political parties with similar aims are often opposed in practice. It is not so much their ideology that holds them together, as the personal bond between the leaders and their followers.[5] One can make a comparison with, say, British political parties. In the 1951 elections, it was found that 80 per cent. of the electors had never voted for any party other than the one they then chose. They followed their leader just as blindly as the Javanese peasant or politician followed his. The leaders of British electors, however, are men who make certain promises ; the leaders of the Javanese are men who are in certain positions irrespective of their aims.

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[5] Cf. H. Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Ithaca, 1957, p. 75.

The unit of social action is therefore the leader and his group. These units are usually local in character, and kinship links play a very strong part. In addition, there are broader divisions of a number of leaders who follow another leader. The most important group is probably that of the officials. In a social sense these are the descendants of Javanese nobility and perform the same functions of administration ; many are actually members of the nobility. Politically they are represented in the Nationalist Party. Secondly there are the Muslim traders, the only Indonesian group engaged in trade. Most of the commerce of the country has been in the hands of either Europeans or Chinese. These Muslim traders are a small group in Java but are much stronger in the other islands. In Java they have been the despised ; Javanese culture places a negative value upon trade as a way of life and the only esteemed occupation has been working for government. It is therefore not surprising, perhaps, that these traders stress their adherence to Islam ; in the case of most other Indonesian Muslims (95 per cent. of the population) allegiance is purely nominal. Politically they favour the Modernist Muslim *Masjumi* party. The vast masses of the peasantry are largely represented, in Java, either by the Orthodox Muslim *Nahdatul Ulama* party or, in the more poverty-stricken areas, by the Communist party ; on the other islands the peasantry support the *Masjumi*. Lastly, the estate workers and urban labourers give their votes to the Communists.[6]

Independence for Indonesia means that control has shifted from a group which had its origins, base and social links mainly outside the society, to one which has them within it. The consequences are important. The Dutch had no compulsion to favour one or another group within the archipelago ; a group drawn from within the archipelago, however, is to be expected to look after its own. Nepotism in high places has followed ; given the sociological circumstances, it was inevitable, and it would have been suspected in any case.

Certain factors lent colour to accusations of ethnic group favouritism. Java had received most Dutch attention. It had the largest population, it was the most closely administered, it received most educational facilities. It was therefore natural that the Indonesian civil service should mostly consist of Javanese. Had they been restricted to their group area, as they had been for a large part of the Dutch period, no harm would have ensued. But it was implicit in the conception of a national state that administrators should not be so restricted, and Javanese officials were therefore sent all over the archipelago (there were, in any case, no others). In terms of education, an educated Indonesian from the non-Javanese parts of the archipelago is closer to a Javanese official than he was to a Dutch official; thoughts of replacement occurred all the more easily. It was not long before the withdrawal of Javanese officials was being demanded to make way for local men.

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[6] Cp. Feith, op cit., pp. 82-87.

There is a further characteristic of the predominantly Javanese administration which deserves mention. Social systems originating in irrigation economics tend to develop despotic characteristics: strict obedience, lack of independence, and the centralisation of power. Such was the Javanese system. The Dutch used it with no fundamental change for their own purposes. Hence the administration of the archipelago is now in the hands of a bureaucracy with these characteristics.

The irrigation economy, however, was restricted mainly to Java; the outer islands had systems of cultivation which did not encourage the growth of despotism. They were never centralised; their social systems stressed independence and initiative. The characteristics of the Indonesian administration were therefore bound to conflict with their traditional practices. In reaction against this, the demand has grown for more regional control over the administration, not merely the replacement of its personnel by local people.

Of course, administration is merely a tool of government. The constitution of Indonesia, however, provides for only one chamber, and representatives are elected almost exclusively on a population basis. There is no provision for regional representation at all. Hence the majority of representatives are responsible to Javanese constituencies.[7] Since, in addition, their social links are almost exclusively with Java, it is inevitable that they, and with them the House of Representatives as a whole, should favour Java. From this have arisen the complaints by the less populous islands that, compared with either their needs for development or their contributions to the national coffers, they have been neglected.

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[7] Also, though Java has 62 per cent. of the population, it has 70 per cent. of the seats in Parliament. Feith, op. cit., p. 88.

No doubt, the social links with any particular area of Indonesia should have been ignored by a strong government. Unfortunately, this is what Indonesia has never had. In the early days of the Republic, elections were of course impossible. Hence the representative bodies were composed of delegates from whatever social groupings existed. Governments were invariably coalitions, supported more by outside pressure from the Dutch than by any internal forces. With the withdrawal of the enemy, conflicts of interest emerged. Governments continued to be coalitions, but they now were impotent. They fell frequently, not due to defeat in parliament, but to the defection of one of the groups within the parties in the coalition. When the time came to choose an electoral system, it was only natural that the various parties should choose proportional representation. They thus perpetuated weak government.

A community needs government, but not necessarily, of course, from a cabinet. In France, for long periods, it has come from the administration. But the Indonesian civil service was in no position to emulate the French. To quote a senior official in 1951 : 'It lacks the training, it lacks the experience, it lacks the culture' appropriate to a civil service ; leave alone one which has to govern as well. To make matters worse, though the two upper centres of control were both unable to carry out their proper functions, there was little or no delegation of authority to local government. There had been provisions for decentralisation written into the constitution, but neither the parliamentary representatives nor the government administrators were willing to implement them. Consequently, necessary decisions were avoided ; situations deteriorated beyond repair. The problems, however, remained ; and the essential functions of government began to be appropriated by other groups.

The constitution provides for a president on the French pattern, performing constitutional functions ; and not on the American. That Sukarno has not been obliged to remain within this framework, and yet has evaded all responsibility for departing from it, is due to weaknesses in the situation which he has successfully exploited. His first open intervention in politics was in October 1952. The then Defence Minister was proposing to modernise the army. This would have meant reducing the number of irregular troops. These were mostly supporters of the nationalist party ; and its parliamentary members clamoured for the minister to resign. An armed demonstration was then mounted in Jakarta by certain senior officers in the Ministry of Defence. It demanded the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of elections, which were expected to reduce nationalist representation. Sukarno refused to do so until he had the reactions of the areas outside Jakarta. In the meanwhile he encouraged the seconds-in-command in certain military areas to depose their commanders, who were not nationalist-inclined. There was then no need to hold elections. He has also intervened on the public stage to urge the retention of the secular state, and that the constitution be not changed to an Islamic type. When he saw, in the pre-election parliament, that the nationalists could not govern alone, he urged them to accept a compact with the Communists. In return for a free hand in the country, the Communists were to give parliamentary support to the Nationalists. Since the latter controlled the local administration, their 'free hand' proved very helpful. As we know, the Communists polled about a quarter of the total votes in the elections of 1955.

Since then, of course, Sukarno has produced his concept of 'guided democracy'. This, in essence, is nothing other than the corporate state. Needless to say, the guides would have been Sukarno and a group of advisers, like him quite irresponsible. He has already appointed Communists to the new Council of State he has created; he proposed to give them even more when the complete apparatus was finally installed. His apologists declare that he does this in order to dilute the Communist strength; others say that he wishes to keep Communist support for himself, since he has no other organisation behind him – the Nationalists, unlike the Communists and the Muslim parties, do not have a mass following. Indeed, his detractors allege that he has no objection to having Indonesia a Communist state provided he remains president.

The other contender for the place of power vacated by the constitutional government is, of course, the Indonesian Army. It is the only social organisation whose discipline compares with that of the Communist Party. This does not mean that it is anti-Communist. On the other hand, an uneasy balance is maintained between the neutrals, the anti-Communists, and the Communists, with the last controlling the garrisons of the two main towns, Jakarta and Surabaya. The Chief of Staff, it should be mentioned, is an anti-Communist, though he has no time for parliament either.

Indonesia's political ills have produced economic decline. The weakness of government meant, for instance, that no definite policy regarding foreign investment could be taken, with the result that there appears to be no new capital flowing into Indonesia apart from that going through one oil company. A weak government could not hope to do other than bow to organised groups, even when they were harming the community. The wage demands of Communist-led estate workers have gone uncurbed to such an extent that it is no longer worth while for many western-owned plantations to continue in operation. Towards the end of 1957, the government was unable to prevent the forcible seizure of western concerns by Communist-led trade unions, even though prominent figures openly stated that this would harm the economy.

The seizures were the culmination of a long series of attacks against western firms. Apart from the oil companies, they were mainly plantations and exporting and importing concerns which maintained a large and efficient distribution network. Between them and the peasantry came the Chinese traders, engaged in small trade. They, too, have had pressures directed against them; but the personal character of their business operations, and the informal nature of their transactions, equip them well to avoid the machinations of the state. Hence, as westerners have moved out of the various spheres of business, the Chinese have moved in.

The means taken to squeeze both westerners and Chinese were predominantly of two forms: discriminatory legislation, excluding them from certain occupations; and denial of the foreign exchange necessary for their operations. These measures were intended, of course, to open opportunities in the economic field for native-born Indonesians. No one can doubt that this is a necessary and laudable task. But that it had to be attempted by ejecting productive elements of the economy tells its own tale. The cake was shrinking; and if Indonesians were to have any part of it, those who already had slices had to surrender them.

Indonesia has been living on its capital for some time now.[8] Every government, as we know, is responsible first to its supporters; wise constitutions make their interests coincide with those of the wider community. It would have been infinitely preferable if the supporters of Indonesian governments could have been given slices of a larger cake, for the community's welfare undoubtedly lies in retaining all its productive elements, not in ejecting them. In Indonesia, however, the interests of government supporters, especially of the nationalist party, indirectly run counter to the measures necessary to the expansion of the economy. The surplus of educated unemployed, which had fed the nationalist movement, continued after its victory. Their aim was to enter the economic field not as small tradesmen, but as occupants of desks in large organisations. Hence followed much governmental solicitude which could be little afforded, and finally the ejection of western office-holders from commercial organisations. It should also be noted that this policy became not nationalist, but racialist in character. Many of the Chinese in Java have no allegiance to China. Many have Javanese, not Chinese culture. It is therefore all the more striking that government measures are directed against them as much as against westerners and foreign Chinese. Indeed, the Indonesian Chinese are, if anything, worse off than the foreign Chinese ; the latter do at least have a government to which they can turn for support.

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[8] D. W. Fryer, 'Economic Aspects of Indonesian Disunity', *Pacific Affairs* XXX, No. 3, pp. 195-208, Sep. 1957, p. 196.

It would be pleasant to record that these measures had achieved their objective. This has not been the case. The attempt to replace European and Chinese importers has merely meant that Indonesians have sold their licences in exchange for a large slice of the profits of importing. This form of corruption has involved very high levels of government itself, and all attempts to end it have failed. No group of Indonesian importers has emerged. That governments have been driven to these measures is a measure of their need to satisfy their supporters. Import licences were given on the condition that contributions were made to party coffers. The result of all this waste is evident in Jakarta, which has an international reputation for the number of its cars.

Java is the stronghold of the Nationalist Party. It is there that Indonesia's capital has been consumed, much of it on buying that party's political support. But the funds for these purposes came from the non-Javanese islands. Growth of population, and the post-war fall of productivity have made Java dependent on the contributions of the less populous islands. This situation did not harmonise well with the neglect of which they complained, and it was not long before the problem of separatism became a live issue.

The danger that a movement would arise for, say, erecting a separate Sumatran state, had never been lost sight of by Indonesian administrators. (They had had many reminders. The state of East Indonesia had had nearly a year's existence before it was absorbed, in 1950, into the unitary state. The dissident movement of 1951, known as the Republic of the Southern Moluccas, was in a sense its heir.) Unfortunately, the only steps taken to meet the danger were to brand all who mentioned the possibility as sedition-mongers, and all who complained of neglect as separatists. No material concessions, either administrative or economic, were made.

In the meanwhile, the Nationalist governments concentrated attention on Java. Facilities in the less populous islands continued to deteriorate. Roads in Sumatra became impassable ; the cash cropper of that area could not take his produce to market, and found his income falling. The favouring of Javanese, or at least Nationalist, importers, meant that the importers in the other islands were left out in the cold. With authority centralised, local administrators in the less populous islands, who were usually Javanese, were hamstrung in dealing with the problems facing them. Lastly, attempts to reduce the numbers in the army battalions in the other islands resulted in dissatisfaction with the central government among the military also. Discontent came to a head with the autonomous movements in Central and South Sumatra and in North Celebes of 1956/1957. For a long time the government neither ceased to pay the usual subsidy for local government, nor attempted military action, and accepted the independent trade which these areas had embarked upon. Only towards the end of 1957 when Dutch concerns in Jakarta were taken over by Communist-led gangs and the exodus of the Dutch began, did matters take a more serious turn. A number of Indonesians, known for their efficiency, incorruptibility, and democratic ideals, fled to Padang and presented an ultimatum to Sukarno to eject the Communists from his Council of State. On his failing to do so, they declared an alternative government. The central government then attacked. Sumatra soon fell to government forces ; the east of Indonesia held out a little longer. The Communists remain on the Council.

In Indonesia, the people of the less populous islands seem to believe they stand to gain by breaking the union. As long as this balance is not righted, so also there will be a tendency to break away. The only remedy would appear to be to give them a larger say in formulating policy for the state, whether by re-instituting a second chamber or otherwise. Unfortunately, this is not the method being followed. On the contrary, all independent trade has been forbidden ; and there is no mention of compensatory benefits from the central government.

There are formidable obstacles to achieving a permanent unity by consent. It would inevitably mean, in the absence of an increase in the size of the cake, the surrender of power by those who have it. Parliament, especially the Nationalist Party, does not want its powers curbed by a second chamber. The party leaders do not wish to return to the provinces the foreign exchange they earn, and so reduce the funds available in Jakarta. The administration, largely Javanese, does not want to devolve authority. It would be natural for them all to assume that the government's military success justifies their belief that the insurrections were purely the work of a few misguided individuals. It is therefore to be feared that little will be done to cure the fundamental causes of instability.

The unity of Indonesia is under great strain. For military action, whatever its rights and wrongs, usually unites those against whom it is used. Anti-Javanese feeling is therefore likely to have been not decreased but consolidated. It would be wise to expect Indonesia's separatist troubles to recur.

The 1908 Blackball Strike

P. J. O'FARRELL

THE HARDENING of the arteries of Liberalism in the first years of this century caused dissatisfaction among many of Seddon's supporters. Socialists asserted their independence when they formed the New Zealand Socialist Party in 1901. Trades and Labour Councils began to rankle under the Government's authoritarian complacency and expressed grave misgivings about the policy of the Liberals. The tide of economic prosperity which had so helped Seddon in office was beginning to turn, and, if the Premier realised this, he did nothing. Resentment of Seddon's dictatorial arrogance and the feeling that real reform had been stifled, prompted the first attempt to form a Labour Party at the Trades and Labour Conference of 1904.

Criticism of the Seddonist regime was widespread before 1906, but it was only his death that broke the spell he had woven around the mass of trusting and sentimental Seddonites. For the Socialists, Seddon's death was a profound liberation. It is no coincidence that the New Zealand Socialist Party experienced a marked revival immediately after Seddon's death,[1] and that socialist organisation in the Greymouth coal-mining district on the West Coast of the South Island began soon after King Dick had passed from the political scene.

Between the passage of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1894, and November 1906, New Zealand was indeed a country without strikes. The workers expected much of the Court, and the general tendency to advance wages during the first six or eight years of the Act [2] met with their wholehearted approval. When it became obvious, about the turn of the century, that legislation in their interest and Government sympathy were not continuing, the workers took a renewed interest in unionism. Unions increased in number, and workers, disappointed politically, turned to the Arbitration Court for

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1 *Socialist* (Melbourne), October 13, 1906, January 26, May 25, June 22, 1907. In September, three months after Seddon's death, the Socialist Party newspaper 'The Commonwealth' reappeared. Elsie Mann, wife of the English socialist trade unionist, bore testimony to Seddon's amazing ascendancy over New Zealand workers, an influence which kept socialism in abeyance. *Socialist*, June 15, 1907.

2 M. B. Hammond, 'The Regulation of Wages in New Zealand', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. XXXI, May 1917, p. 415.

that greater share in the national wealth to which their gains in the nineties and the tenor of early Seddonism led them to believe they were entitled. They were quickly disappointed. From 1901 it became obvious that the Court would concede no further wage increases as these were demanded.[3] Then in February 1906 the Court gave a decision which created widespread indignation among workers and confirmed growing hostility to the Court. The Dunedin seamen who had been working under a wage reduction dating from 1893, were refused an increase. The Court declared that the prosperity of steamship companies could not justify this.[4] Increases of wages would be granted only when the applicants were able to prove that higher payment was necessary to maintain real wages at the existing level, and it was becoming almost impossible for workers to convince the Court that such was the case. The trifling strike of Auckland tramway employees in November 1906 indicated the changing attitude of workers towards the Act.

The first significant attack on the arbitration system was very soundly repulsed. In February 1907, Wellington slaughtermen, who were mostly casual workers from Australia, ignored arbitration and struck for higher wages. This dispute spread throughout New Zealand, and though the slaughtermen gained a portion of the desired increase, they were rigorously prosecuted under the terms of the Act. Two hundred and sixty-seven strikers were fined £5 each. Such firm enforcement of the penalty clause took the savour from the strikers' partial victory.

Though subject to bitter criticism, the arbitration system still commanded the tolerance of most workers even after 1906.[5] It was, after all, backed by the powers of law and order, and seemed, for all its defects, the best available means of seeking improvement. A deep impression had been left on many workers' minds by the utter defeat of strike action in 1890, and for those whose memories were shorter, the slaughtermen's Pyrrhic victory was no enticement to direct action.

[3] In 1901 claims by the Thames Gold Miners and Christchurch Operative Bootmakers were dismissed, the Bootmakers making the first protest against an award. (Dept. of Labour, *Awards etc. made under Conciliation and Arbitration Act*, Vol. iii, p. 24; Le Rossignol and Stewart, *State Socialism in New Zealand*, p. 250). Decisions in 1902 took a similar trend. (Auckland Iron and Brass Moulders (*Awards*, Vol. iii, p. 899); Wellington Bookbinders (*ibid.*, p. 349); Canterbury Woollen Mill Employees (*ibid.*, p. 507).

[4] *Awards*, Vol. vii, p. 60.

[5] Le Rossignol, 'A General Strike in New Zealand', *American Economic Review*, Vol. IV, June, 1914, p. 293.

The twelve strikes in 1907 were basically impromptu protests against the inability of the Court to deal promptly with grievances and evidence of a dissatisfaction with the Court as then constituted. These slight industrial disturbances were reactions against the Court as it was, not deliberate and fundamental attacks on the very foundation of arbitration. Why then did a major strike, developing into a vigorous and purposeful attack on the whole arbitration system, occur at Blackball in February 1908, and why did it succeed? The problem is more complex than Sutch[6] would have it. Was this simply a case of socialist ideology overcoming an attachment to arbitration? Even if this was so, the crux of the problem is why and how socialists gained ascendancy.

It is the purpose of this paper to discuss, within the limited reference of the Blackball strike, problems fundamental to New Zealand political history — the reasons why doctrinaire radicals gained support for socialist policies from non-socialist workers, and the methods the socialists used to secure such support. Grey district socialists were a very small group, dominated by Hickey, Semple and Webb who had arrived in the locality in 1906. They were mainly young coal miners, most were Australians, and all held in varying forms the basic idea of class war, expressed industrially, and leading to a vague social condition of co-operation, justice and equality. Their hallmark was enthusiasm. In the case of the Blackball strike, it is contended that socialist support was gained, firstly by establishing a solid socialist core, by socialists identifying their agitation with a long-suffered grievance, and then provoking a strike on an appeal to union solidarity. The strike was carefully planned and shrewdly engineered by a few convinced socialists, as a means both of attacking a detested arbitration system and of attracting attention to their ideas. Their success in gaining unionist support was the result, not only of their eloquent presentation of social panaceas, but, more important, of their ability to incorporate their designs with that basic unionist precept, solidarity. The socialists were indeed an intellectual vanguard, but they were careful to present new ideas in familiar guise. Consummate opportunists, they took advantage of every favourable tendency within the Union, pressing any advantage to a conclusion beyond the circumscribed bounds of older unionism. They were quick to suggest a line of action favourable to socialist policy and would promptly reinterpret it for the doubtful in the basic terms of unionism. The socialists not only led, but more often, leavened. Thus it was in Blackball in 1908.

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[6] W. B. Sutch, *The Quest for Security in New Zealand*, p. 93.

The State Miners Union, Runanga, formed in 1904, became in 1907 the centre of dissemination for socialist propaganda and organisation in the Grey district. This was a district where geographic isolation and the predominance of the coal-mining industry, among other factors, had resulted in the formation of a close-knit community unique in New Zealand for its intense provincial feeling, linked with a rough and ready, but sensitive equalitarianism. The State mine unionists were mostly English and Scottish miners who had been not unfamiliar with socialist propaganda in Great Britain. On this English base, a few socialists, led by a New Zealander, P. Hickey, and an Australian, R. Semple, erected an edifice of American industrial union theory, as expressed in the propaganda of the Industrial Workers of the World, organised in Chicago in 1905. This theory was, in the main, received in New Zealand, indirectly, from Australian sources. Not long after Seddon's death the district experienced a pronounced return of prosperity, when the coal miners were fully employed and earning reasonable wages. It was in this period of minor boom that the socialists employed at the State Mine took the initiative in organising the Grey district working class.

In October 1907 Runanga socialists, led by the rabid P. H. Hickey, began organising Socialist Party Branches throughout the district.[7] The socialism advocated was socialist unionism, one big industrial union, on the principles of the I.W.W., and Ben Tillett, the English unionist leader, arrived opportunely from Australia to assist the propaganda.[8] In the Grey district, rousing socialist meetings enlivened the last two months of 1907.

The essence of the new unionism was freedom, freedom from arbitration and liberty to strike. Arbitration militated against the class war, perpetuated the wages-system, and was a capitalist means of keeping the workers in subjection, whilst robbing them.[9] Socialists held vague ideas of inaugurating a period of industrial warfare as a prelude to the social revolution, and promptly set about provoking an

[7] *Greymouth Evening Star*, October 24, 28, 31, November 4, 1907; *Grey River Argus*, October 24, 28, 1907.

[8] *Star*, November 12, 1907; *Argus*, November 11, 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 1907.

[9] A convenient statement of the socialist attitude towards arbitration is contained in H. E. Holland's *Labor Leg-Ironed*, 1912.

industrial conflict in which their principles would receive national publicity and vindication. After 1890 the strike weapon was feared as a dangerous boomerang. If the socialists were to gain support for their new industrial unionism, unshackled by arbitration, they must demonstrate that it could succeed. They furthered this design with rapid and bold planning, acute appreciation of their numerical insignificance and awareness of their lack of influence over the workers.

For reasons which will later be considered, the socialists chose the Blackball coal mine as the target for their attack. The first step was to place socialist agitators where the conflict was planned to take place. In December, P. H. Hickey, P. C. Webb and G. R. Hunter terminated their employment at the State Mine, Runanga. When the Blackball mine re-opened on January 5, 1908, these three men applied for work, and being experienced miners, were given positions. These socialists had the dual rôle of educating their fellow mine workers as quickly as possible, and of precipitating a dispute between management and men when the time was opportune.

Having installed themselves in Blackball, the socialists opened an energetic socialist and anti-arbitration campaign. Hickey, familiar with industrial conflict in the U.S.A., led the onslaught. He lashed the Arbitration Act, and the Court that administered it, with biting scorn. 'I consider,' he jibed, 'the Arbitration Court a splendid capitalistic measure for keeping the workers in subjection.'[10] Affronted arbitrationists recoiled in horror. Many unionists recalled the misery associated with the strike of 1890.[11] The gains made since then should not be placed in hazard. Hickey made the socialist position clear. 'If the Arbitration Court will not grant us our just demands . . . we will sever our connection with it entirely.'[12]

This frontal attack by Grey district socialists on the arbitration system early in 1908 was conducted under Australian influence and example. Especially influential was H. E. Holland and his weekly *International Socialist Review* which first appeared in February 1907. Holland had vigorously opposed the Australian arbitration system since 1900[13] and in the third issue of the *Review* he commenced a detailed and vehement attack on it.[14] This denunciation was maintained throughout 1907 and the theoretical exposure of the Act's defects was given practical vindication by the success of the Sydney Coal Lumpers' Strike which began in April and ended in August.[15] The success of this strike as a blow against the arbitration system gave Grey socialists both confidence and a pattern which they might follow. It was also a powerful means of convincing the sceptical that a strike could succeed.

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[10] *Star*, January 24, 1908.

[11] *Star*, January 29, 1908.

[12] *Star*, February 3, 1908.

[13] *People and Collectivist* (Newcastle, N.S.W.), July 14, 1900.

[14] *International Socialist Review* (Sydney), February 28, 1907.

Hickey, having opened the attack on arbitration, enlisted the aid of the New Zealand Socialist Party. All available socialist resources were to be mustered for this decisive conflict, and the blow struck against arbitration was to resound throughout New Zealand. Industrial unionist ideas already had a centre of promulgation in Wellington, where an I.W.W. Club had been formed in January 1908 with a membership of sixty.[16] I.W.W. principles were the stock-in-trade of H. M. Fitzgerald, organiser of the New Zealand Socialist Party, who arrived in the district late in January.[17] Fitzgerald commenced a lecture tour which centred on Blackball. There, socialist publicity and organisation ensured that he spoke to the largest crowds ever assembled in that township. A branch of the Socialist Party was enthusiastically formed and it was reported that 'the one topic of discussion there [at Blackball] is Socialism'.[18]

The attention that the socialists and their ideas attracted at Blackball is easily explainable. An isolated and dreary town with a population of about five hundred, Blackball offered little in the way of entertainment, and the concerted socialist descent on the normally quiet mining township must have created considerable excitement. Street-corner speakers with red ties and astonishing vehemence spoke on matters of intimate concern to a community whose whole life was centred around the coal mine. It is small wonder that the socialists attracted attention. They also attracted some local support, as is evidenced by the formation of the Socialist Party Branch. Conversions to socialism probably came from two groups of miners, those who had been familiar with socialism, or had actually been socialists in Great Britain, and the younger men, the natural radicals. It is unlikely that more than thirty or forty of the one hundred and thirty Blackball miners became avowed socialists.

[15] *I.S.R.*, April 20 to August 3, 1907.

[16] Minutes of Sydney I.W.W. Club, February 26, 1908 (Mitchell Library).

[17] Mr. and Mrs. Backman, Greymouth, to Secretary, Sydney I.W.W., January, 1908. (I.W.W. Correspondence, Mitchell Library.)

[18] *Argus*, February 4, 11; *Star*, February 1, 1908.

Interest and enthusiasm having reached their height, the socialists decided that it was time for action. The softening-up process of propaganda was in full swing, sufficient conversions had been made for a nucleus of socialist support, and, most important, the socialists had, awaiting their championing, a cause which would rally non-socialist unionists behind them.

The time allowed by the Blackball Coalmining Company for miners' 'crib', that is, lunch time, had long been a miners' grievance. The Blackball Miners' Union had been formed in 1900 because of the management's imposition of a fifteen minutes' 'crib'.[19] Socialist anti-arbitrationist propaganda found sympathy among the miners who had been attempting since 1900 to have the Court lengthen the award lunch time to half an hour. This they were unable to do, and they were becoming increasingly convinced that the arbitration system was merely a set of shackles to bind them to an inadequate time to eat their mid-day meal, as well as being obdurately set against any wage increase. As has been indicated, it is most unlikely that many Blackball miners were convinced socialists, but they were unitedly hostile to the fifteen-minute 'crib' and to that section of their award that bound them to such a degrading injustice. The socialist agitators, shrewdly calculating the deep but incoherent unrest on this question, stepped in and gave the miners' grievance organisation and direction. Not only did this 'crib' issue, long suffered, ensure a maximum support for a strike from the miners, but it offered an opportunity of securing widespread public sympathy which a mere wages dispute would not have commanded. The protest against such a gross and inhuman practice lifted the strike to the dignity of a crusade, untainted by vulgar demands for higher payment. Thus it was presented to the public by the miners' socialist spokesmen. The 'crib' injustice also provided an excellent thin end for the anti-arbitrationist wedge. A system capable of condoning such an abomination must itself be an abomination. In this manner was the socialist argument pressed onward, no doubt to the wonderment of most Blackball miners whose antagonism was initially directed towards the fifteen-minute 'crib', not towards subversion of industrial order as ordained by the arbitration system.

The first attempt to provoke a strike failed. The Blackball Miners' Union had been induced, late in January, to pass a resolution declaring that its members would take half an hour for lunch. The management, instead of discharging the agitators and thus giving pretext for a socialist strike call, prosecuted Hickey for refusal to obey the manager's instruction to take fifteen minutes only.[20] This incident could not be magnified into sufficient cause for a just strike, so the offence was repeated. On February 27, seven unionist members of the Blackball Socialist Party, led by Hickey, Webb and Hunter, were discharged. These seven men persisted in taking half an hour for lunch after being ordered at the end of fifteen minutes to resume work. Their dismissal was swift and summary. 'Hickey, take up your ——— tools and clear to h—— out of this!' was the manager's riddance to Hickey.[21]

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[19] *Argus*, March 27, 1908.

The discharge of the seven men played directly into the socialists' hands. Immediately following the dismissals, the Miners' Union resolved to stop work until all the men were reinstated. This Union resolution raises the question of the reasons for the Union's compliance with socialist insistence on strike action. The New Zealand-wide dissatisfaction with the Arbitration Court has already been noted. The Blackball miners had been in a parlous economic position in the nineties and the Arbitration Court had done little for them. The Union had, in 1901, secured a twenty per cent. wage increase under the Board of Conciliation, but this increase merely placed Blackball miners on the same wage level as miners elsewhere.[22] An attempt in 1902 to induce the Court to grant a further wage increase failed.[23] Another unsuccessful Blackball pay dispute occurred in 1903,[24] and in 1904 the one hundred and fifty miners at Blackball were dismissed, only half that number being re-engaged. This appears to have been a managerial device to avoid indictable breach of the industrial agreement while effecting a wages reduction applying to those miners re-employed.[25] Such was their destitute condition in 1905 that Blackball miners who were working one day only in the week asked for relief work as railway labourers. Of the hundred applicants, only twenty were given such employment.[26] At the end of 1906, when the

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[20] P. H. Hickey *Red Fed Memoirs*, pp. 11-12; *Argus*, February 12, 1908. A small fine was inflicted on Hickey in the Magistrate's Court, Greymouth, early in March. *Argus*, March 3, 1908.

[21] *Argus*, March 12, 1908; *Awards*, Vol. ix, p. 59.

[22] *Argus*, June 24, July 13, 1907; *Journal of the Department of Labour*, 1901, pp. 932-4.

[23] *J.D.L.*, 1902, pp. 374-9.

[24] *Argus*, April 11, 1903.

[25] *Argus*, August 20, 24, September 5, 8, 22; *Star*, September 20, November 1, 1904.

[26] *Argus*, November 7; *Star*, October 14, 17, November 7, 1905.

Paparoa mine was opened, the employment position improved, and continued to improve throughout 1907.

The socialists began their work in Blackball in a period of rising prosperity. The result of this improvement was to engender confidence among the miners. It seemed that they had at last begun to cast off economic thraldom and the stultifying effects of destitution. Their previous experience and the tendency of Arbitration Court decisions throughout New Zealand made them realise that if they were to secure that greater share of the national wealth which prosperity made conceivable, some instrument other than the Court as it was, would have to be found. The socialists' basic object was to secure just that better distribution of wealth and they held arbitration in contempt. It is not surprising that the miners should have looked on the socialists at least without disfavour.

Had these socialists, in plain terms, incited the miners to strike in open defiance of arbitration as such, it is likely that the majority of unionists would have refused their support. Flagrant disregard of the law could not have had wide appeal. The socialists did not attempt to achieve their object by such crude methods. They planned the strike attempt so as to involve the question of union solidarity. Three of the seven men who were dismissed for taking half an hour for lunch on February 27, though unionists, were thought of locally as primarily socialists, having recently arrived in the district. The four other men, as well as being socialists, were older Blackball unionists, well-known men with some years of unionist standing. The situation, as presented to the Union membership on February 27, was that seven of their number, four of whom at least were well known in the district, had been summarily and insultingly dismissed, due to their compliance with a Union resolution. There was only one means of immediate protest which would vindicate the principles of unionism, and that was to strike.

Realising his folly in allowing himself to be provoked, the manager at once expressed his willingness to reinstate the dismissed men. The Union, under socialist prompting, was not to be bought off so cheaply, and countered with a demand for payment for the loss of time resulting from the dismissal.[27] To such an abject submission the manager refused to agree, as no doubt the Union expected. The strikers, with the support of all the district miners' unions and the Westland Trades and Labour Council, prepared for a long struggle.[28]

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[27] *Awards*, op. cit., pp. 57-59.

[28] *Star*, 4 March, 1908.

As the strike continued, another grievance besides that of crib time was given prominence. A week after the strike had begun, the Union objected to a number of truckers working ten hours a day. It is likely that this new issue was raised by socialists who feared an early settlement of the 'crib' question before they could exploit to the uttermost the possibilities the strike offered for national publicity. Again outwitted, the manager attempted to turn this Union stratagem to the company's advantage. It was announced that the seven men had not been dismissed for their attitude on the 'crib' question, but because they were superfluous labour. While there was work enough for all miners if a few truckers worked ten hours, there were too many employed if all were to work eight hours a day.[29] This concoction deceived no one.

The strike had been in progress little over a week when the Labour Department instituted proceedings against the Blackball Union for declaring a strike. At a session of the Arbitration Court in Greymouth, 'about thirty miners attended as witnesses each with a red ribbon in his coat and the majority wearing red ties as well'.[30] The question of 'crib' time being raised, Judge W. A. Sim expressed the opinion that fifteen minutes was ample. Then to the scorn of the miners he adjourned the Court for an hour and a half for luncheon. After hearing the evidence, the Court fined the union £75, the maximum penalty for striking being £100. The Union's counterclaim against the Blackball Coal Company for wrongful dismissal of employees failed.[31]

It now seemed to the public that after the Court's decision and the heavy fine inflicted, the defeated unionists would return to work. They were not so easily brought to heel. One of the reasons why unionists had condoned the socialists' insistence on direct action, was that they believed that their 'crib' grievance would not be remedied by the Court. What had been a strong suspicion was now, after the Judge's remark that fifteen minutes was ample, an abiding certainty. Having defied the arbitration system so far, the majority of unionists were determined to fight to the limit of their resources. With splendid disregard for the authority of the Court, the Blackball Union refused to pay the £75 fine. This gesture of defiance captured public attention throughout New Zealand.[32]

[29] *Star*, February 29, March 2, 1908.

[30] Hickey, op. cit., p. 13.

[31] *Argus*, March 12; *Star*, March 13, 1908; *Awards*, op. cit., Vol. ix, pp. 55-60; Hickey, op. cit., p. 13.

[32] *Argus*, March 28, 1908.

Notoriety brought the publicity socialists desired, but the determination to defy the Court and continue the strike aroused much unionist, as well as public criticism. Those who feared socialism denounced the strikers, and those who feared capitalism dreaded the consequence of another defeat such as that of 1890.[33] The majority of pro-socialist unionist support must have been slight.

The strike now having become news of national industrial importance, the Blackball Miners' Union sent Hickey, a socialist, and D. K. Pritchard, a non-socialist unionist, on a collecting expedition to other parts of New Zealand.[34] They met with a mixed reception, many trade unionists deploring the forsaking of arbitration and refusing to assist.[35] They did, however, succeed in collecting contributions amounting to £800, and with the continued financial support of Grey district miners' unions, the strikers were in a strong position.[36] They rejected a Company offer of twenty minutes for lunch, and payment of half the £75 fine.[37] Then the Union successfully weathered an attempt, engineered by the Company, to divide the Union against itself.[38] Two further Company proposals were rejected in April.[39]

On May 12 the eleven-week strike was settled. The settlement was a direct result of the flooding of the nearby Tyneside mine at Brunner, a few days earlier, by which one hundred miners were deprived of employment. The Blackball management decided that the mine would work two shifts of eight hours each, which would obviate the final point of dispute – that of the truckers working ten hours – and also employ the Tyneside miners. The settlement agreed on by Union and management was that the seven dismissed men would be reinstated and that there would be no victimisation, that there would be half an hour for 'crib', and that all men employed would work eight hours only.[40] This was a triumph for the strikers who had gained every point for which they had fought.[41]

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[33] *Star*, March 7, 16, 1908.

[34] *Argus*, March 21, 1908.

[35] *Lyttelton Times*, March 23, 27, 1908; *Argus*, March 20.

[36] *Argus*, July 31, 1908.

[37] *Argus*, March 23, 1908.

[38] *Argus*, April 9, 10, 13, 15, 1908.

[39] *Argus*, April 14, 25; *Star*, April 27, 1908.

[40] *Argus*, May 10, 13, 1908.

[41] G. H. Scholefield, *New Zealand in Evolution*, p. 239, says of this settlement, 'they accepted conditions which spelled defeat and returned to duty disgusted and chastened in their hostility to the Act.'

The 1890 strike defeat remained an integral part of the workers' thought, until its enervating effect was mitigated by the spectacular victory at Blackball in 1908. Memories of a strike that failed were replaced by the example of one that had succeeded. The Arbitration Court and system emerged from the conflict gravely discredited. Instead of reviewing its policy, the Court became, in the years immediately following 1908, even more hostile to the claims of unionists.[42] The result was that the more radical unions, after 1908, cancelled their registrations as their awards terminated.[43]

Having used the Blackball strike for their purpose, that of proving the strike method and publicising their doctrines, the socialists left Blackball. Webb and Hunter returned to the State Mine at Runanga and Hickey obtained the secretaryship of the West Coast General Labourers' Union. The centre of socialist activity became again Runanga, and the emphasis was placed on union federation.

The significance of the 1908 Blackball strike lies in the blow it gave the arbitration system, its propaganda value for socialism, and the impulse it gave to union federation and labour organisation. It was obvious, to radicals at least, that no concessions could be expected from the hostile Court. That being so, there were two possible courses of action. The workers could strike, or they could attempt to secure control of the Court. The localised strike was, at best, an unreliable and exhausting weapon. To make direct action more sure of success there must be closer organisation. The initial form of this closer organisation was industrial federation for protection, an aim given expression in the Miners' Federation, which Semple organised in the ferment that followed the Blackball strike, and the 'Red' Federation of Labour. In the face of governmental power even widespread direct action failed, as the so-called 'general' strike of 1913 demonstrated. Parallel with the organisation of an industrial federation there was being developed another and ultimately more fruitful form of closer organisation, in politics. This new and independent worker approach to political action rejected an outworn Liberalism and was inspired by the idea of changing political, and through political, social and economc conditions, so that industrial protection against any form of oppression would no longer be necessary.

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[42] The Court took its vengeance on the Blackball Miners by reducing their hewing rate in December, 1908 (*Awards*, op. cit., pp. 788-96; *Star*, December 2, 1908). The union was unable to cancel its registration until 1910. (*J.D.L.*, 1910, p. 110.) The £75 fine was eventually collected by a levy on the miners' wages. *Argus*, June 2, 10, 27, 1908; Hickey, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

[43] Le Rossignol, 'A General Strike in New Zealand', op. cit., p. 293.

Note

WELLINGTON CENTRAL – THE FIELD AND THE BATTLE

In my article *Wellington Central – the Field and the Battle*[1] I mistakenly stated that in city areas there is no permanent unit of the New Zealand Labour Party at the constituency level, but that local branches within a constituency form an Inter-Branch Council at election time to conduct the campaign. This was the case prior to 1955. At the Labour Party Conference in that year it was decided that I.B.C.s should function not merely during elections, but continuously. I understand that in most city electorates this decision became effective immediately, and that Wellington Central was exceptional in that its I.B.C. did not begin to operate until the 1957 campaign opened. I am assured that it is now in continuous existence.

R. H. BROOKES

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[1] *Political Science,* Vol. 10, no. 2, September 1958.

Book Reviews

LEGAL PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL PLURALISM edited by LEICESTER C. WEBB. Melbourne University Press on behalf of the Australian National University. 197 pages.

THIS BOOK contains eight papers, by six authors, which were read at a seminar organised by the Departments of Law and Political Science at the Australian National University. Three of the papers are on the law of legal personality, two are on theories of legal personality, and three are on political pluralism.

The papers on the law of legal personality are: 'The Internal Affairs of Associations', by Dr. S. J. Stoljar; 'Legal Personality and the Trade Union', by Mr. R. M. Martin; and 'Government as Personalized Legal Entity', by Professor G. Sawer. All three papers are excellent. The knowledge, judgment, and care that went into them show the use that first-class scholars can make of the exceptional opportunities for a life of scholarship that exist in the Australian National University.

The two papers on theories of legal personality are: 'Theories of Legal Personality', by Professor D. P. Derham (of the University of Melbourne); and 'The Corporate Theories of Frederick William Maitland', by Dr. Stoljar. In addition Professor Sawer considers theories of legal personality in the first few pages of the paper listed in the previous paragraph, and does so with splendid good sense.

Professor Derham bases his approach on that used by Professor H. L. A. Hart in his Oxford Inaugural: 'Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence'. Professor Hart's thesis was that the terms of analytical jurisprudence, for instance, 'law', should not be defined, but should be elucidated by considering the conditions under which statements in which they have their characteristic use are true. Professor Derham transfers this technique from analytical jurisprudence to positive law, and offers the following elucidation of 'service':

> [It will] be true to say 'This document has been served'. . . .
> 2. 'When the rules for service of that document laid down by [the] legal system have been complied with.'
> 3. The rules for service of the relevant legal system are as follows . . . (p. 4).

This is a clumsy tautology. In New Zealand, 'service' means what Rule 26 and other relevant Rules of the Code of Civil Procedure say it means. It is not true of the word 'service', though it would be true of the thing law, that the only kind of definition that can be offered is 'an Aristotelian definition by reference to essence' (p. 4). Professor Derham's confusion is all the more surprising since the elucidation of definition is the purpose of a masterly book that he cites in another connexion in a Gertrude-Steinish footnote: 'R. *(sic)* Robinson in his essay 'definition' *(sic)* calls such words 'systematic' words (*Definition,* Oxford, 1950, p. 128)' (p. 8).

Professor Derham paraphrases the judgments in *Bonsor v. Musicians' Union* and *Salomon v. Salomon and Co.* by supposing that the judges addressed to themselves four questions he has devised. The third of these questions reads: '(c) If the rules of law in (a) above are silent or ambiguous, should this entity be recognized as an entity for the purposes of legal reasoning?' (p. 15). In *Bonsor*'s case, which was decided for the plaintiff, this question was 'presented squarely because . . . the law could be treated as silent' (p. 16). The mind reels when a Professor of Jurisprudence says that in a case where judgment was for the plaintiff the law was treated as silent. Under the common law system, if the law seems to be silent, then the law is that a plaintiff has no cause of action.

Dr. Stoljar's paper on the corporate theories of Frederic (not 'Frederick') William Maitland is a very good one, but would have been more suitable for this symposium if less space had been given to trusts and to corporations sole, and more to corporations aggregate.

The three papers on political pluralism are: 'Corporate Personality and Political Pluralism', by Professor Webb; 'Churches and the Modern State', by Mr. D. Pike (of the University of Adelaide); and 'Pluralism and After', also by Professor Webb. Professor Webb's first paper deals with English political pluralism. This is a straightforward subject that was written up competently by several Americans a generation ago. The two longest sections are on Figgis and Laski. The treatment of Figgis is good. The material on Laski is mainly biographical and bibliographical, and what is said about Laski's pluralism is not always satisfactory. It is hard to know why Laski's two basic pluralist arguments, that people sometimes obey other groups than the State, and that the State should allow a large measure of autonomy to other groups, should be described as 'two premises which always pull against one another and are sometimes in direct conflict' (p. 62). An important question of scholarly method is raised by the next statement, that 'the fundamental difficulty of Laski the pluralist arises over his attitude to the natural law' (p. 62). Laski's writings were voluminous, varied, and contradictory, and almost anything can be documented from them; they need to be studied with sympathetic discrimination, and should not be mined for untypical texts. The passage Professor Webb quotes is not even apt, being from a reference to what Stammler and his translators had paradoxically christened 'natural law with a changing content', which is a very different thing from natural law; and there is a suitable untypical passage on natural law in *The State in Theory and Practice* at pp. 96-7. More than that, Professor Webb's train of thought is fantastic: a statement about natural law would not entail any statement about pluralism.

The section on Acton is peculiar. Professor Webb criticises Fasnacht for saying that the young Acton anticipated the pluralism of Gierke and Maitland – apparently on the ground that Acton was still a disciple of Tocqueville, and could not both follow Tocqueville and anticipate later thinkers: 'The passage quoted is one of many such belonging to *The (sic) Rambler* period and is to be regarded, not as an anticipation of Gierke-Maitland *(sic)* but as a reflection of Tocqueville's profound influence over the young Acton' (p. 46) – and then says that the young Acton anticipated the even later pluralism of Figgis. Acton's views *vis-à-vis* Figgis are illustrated by an Actonian passage written by Acton's colleague Richard Simpson. The anticipation of Figgis could have been demonstrated quite easily by saying that the passage of Simpson's, which Professor Webb quotes from Figgis's quotation of it, was quoted by Figgis with approval. Instead Professor Webb sought a parallel passage elsewhere in Figgis, and quotes a passage that is not parallel, although parallel passages are available (in *Churches in the Modern State*, at pp. 51-2, 87-8, 101-2, or 263-4).

Professor Webb discusses Creighton before Acton. Creighton wrote over twenty volumes, but the documentation offered is a quotation from Acton to which Creighton 'would have subscribed' (p. 46). This quotation is textually suspect, being from a book that has had no scholarly repute since Duncan Forbes reviewed it for *The English Historical Review*: Lord Acton, *Essays on Church and State* (ed. Douglas Woodruff). Mr. Forbes, after listing some of the hundreds of textual errors that he had found in the Essays and Notices of Books published in the earlier part of the volume, said of the brief Extracts on pp. 420-473 (and it is from the last of these Extracts that Professor Webb extracted his quotation): 'Mr. Woodruff's selection of "Extracts" is presumably not meant for serious students of Acton, so criticism of omissions here is out of place' (*E.H.R.*, January 1953, No. CCLXVI, p. 158). Had Professor Webb, who writes confidently about Acton's '*Rambler* period' in a sentence I have already quoted, known that Acton wound up *The Rambler* in 1862, he would not have copied out Woodruff's misprint attributing this Extract to the December 1868 *Rambler* (it is from Acton's 'The Count de Montalembert', which appeared ten years earlier in the December 1858 *Rambler*), and would not have thrown light on his extract from it by saying that it was 'written shortly before the Vatican Council proclaimed the doctrine of papal infallibility' (p. 46). Professor Webb's other two quotations from Acton are from Fasnacht's book of snippets of Acton, where they appear as one-sentence quotations, which Professor Webb re-quotes *in toto*. The first comes, though Fasnacht does not say so, from Acton's 'Notes on the Present State of Austria'. Professor Webb quotes the sentence from Fasnacht and not from the essay, and apparently based his Tocqueville-*versus*-pluralism pronouncement on an isolated sentence. The second comes, and Fasnacht says so, from Gasquet's *Lord Acton and His Circle*. Professor Webb gives Gasquet as his source for this isolated sentence, saying that Fasnacht also quotes it, but his version is Fasnacht's version, which is a misquotation of Gasquet's version. Fasnacht does not mention in his foot-note that Gasquet was not author but editor of this book, or that Gasquet *publishes* in it almost 200 of Acton's letters; and Professor Webb says that Gasquet 'quotes' the letter in question, and that Fasnacht 'also' quotes it (p. 47).

Disregarding some surprising pieces of historical interpretation that there is no space to consider here (such as that 'Even before [1914] the rising power of Germany had given an added stimulus to a reaction against the Hegelian theory of the State which had already begun in Oxford' (p. 58) – *post hoc, ergo propter hoc?*) some matters that can be dealt with briefly are worth listing. It is odd, seeing that Figgis and Laurence (not 'Lawrence') edited five volumes of Acton's papers, to name two of the five and imply there were no others (p. 45). The *Free Church* case and the *Osborne* case were decided not by the Privy Council (pp. 48 and 49) but by the House of Lords. The *Free Church* case was decided not under English law (p. 49) but under Scots law. Green and Bosanquet are bracketed on the subject of 'individual self-realization' (p. 51), but they differed on the question whether it is an individual self or a social organism that is realised in the good life, so 'individual self-realization' is one of the exceptional subjects on which their names should not be bracketed – and least of all should this be done in a paper on corporate personality. In a paraphrase of Friedmann's views, 'incorporate' groups becomes 'uncorporate' groups (p. 52). Light is thrown on Figgis's 'view that no statement of doctrine can be final' by saying that it is similar to the position 'taken by Newman in his "Essay on the Development of [Christian] Doctrine"' (p. 53); Professor Webb, who italicises the titles of books, must have forgotten that this is an exceptional 'Essay' in that it fills a volume, and in fact a long one. What is quoted as the *ratio decidendi* on which the New York Court of Appeals upheld the statute that was under consideration in *Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral* (p. 53) is the Court's description of the political grounds on which the New York Legislature had enacted the statute. A statement attributed to Figgis that all groups have a sphere of natural authority over their members (p. 56) is a garbled account of a statement that the church claims that the natural authority she has over her members extends to the provision of a social atmosphere. A quotation in a sentence about the 'realist theory' of group life appears to the reader to have been inserted as a felicitous description of the real personality of a church ('"there is a being which transcends the members and yet is immanent in them"' (p. 57)), but is a garbled version of a description of God's immanence ('there *is* a Being which transcends the members, and yet is immanent in them'). This quotation, whose source is not given, can be found in Sir Ernest Barker's 'The Community and the Church', *Essays on Government*, 2nd edn., p. 285. A passage quoted from Shaw as an illustration of the climate of opinion before 1914 was not written in 1908 (p. 58); it was in an address Shaw delivered in 1888, and can be found in the 1889 edition of *Fabian Essays in Socialism* at p. 181. The statement that 'Cole, in his *Social Theory*, had reserved to the State a purely co-ordinating function' (p. 59) is not correct, for what Cole says in *Social Theory* is that 'co-ordination cannot belong to the function of the State' (p. 101). Moreover, it is absurd to say that a State that had a co-ordinating function would have a purely co-ordinating function, *i.e.*, merely a co-ordinating function. The first thing to learn about pluralism is the distinction between a State with co-ordinating functions and one with co-ordinate functions. It cannot be true (a) that guild socialism was 'produced . . . in the 1920s' (p. 59) and (b) that the publication of Cole's *Guild Socialism Re-stated* in 1920 'was in effect its obituary' (p. 60). The statement that it is hard to believe that a Manchester Jew (Laski) could have had such 'a remarkable imaginative grasp of the realities of religious conviction' (p. 61) is surprising, for what race has a deeper sense of religion than the Jewish? Part of a quotation from Laski (p. 63) is nonsense, because Laski's word 'resume', apparently misprinted for 'presume', is not queried. The date Creighton became Dixie Professor is five years out (p. 45); an article is described as having been written two years after it was published (p. 59); the date of publication of a book is wrong (p. 61); the titles of two books are wrong (pp. 53, 60 and 61); two passages are wrongly described as ending the essays they come from (pp. 47 and 64); the name of a quoted author is misspelt (p. 54); the bibliographical history of the articles collected in a book is misdescribed (p. 61); apart from these errors in the text, several references in foot-notes are incomplete and at least eight foot-notes give either the wrong volume number or the wrong page number; and at least nineteen passages are misquoted in a twenty-one-page paper.

The other two papers call for only brief notice. Mr. Pike gives a miscellany of information and comment. He advocates religious autonomy in matters of faith. He says virtually nothing about corporate personality. Professor Webb, in the final paper, gives brief digests of parts of some books on pluralism in American society. It might have been better if he had tied up the threads of the other papers, or had examined pluralism in Australian society, or had matched the original work of other contributors with some new thinking on the subject of pluralism.

There are only four cross-references from one paper to another (pp. 64, 81, 82, and 196), though Professor Sawer's warning against over-emphasising the abstract quality of legal rules (p. 158) is possibly addressed to Professor Derham. There is a good deal of overlapping, particularly in case law, and particularly between 'The Internal Affairs of Associations' and 'Legal Personality and the Trade Union'. Differences of opinion, which should have come to light in the seminar, and should then have been either eliminated or else buttressed by adequate supporting argument on both sides, lie on the surface of the text unexamined. Thus Professor Derham says that in *Bonsor*'s case the majority of the House of Lords held that the union 'had no independent juristic existence', and the minority that it was 'a distinct legal entity' (p. 16); and Dr. Stoljar says the very opposite: that 'the majority thought the union a separate, suable entity, while the minority resisted this view . . . : [and] stated that liability in less "corporate" language' (pp. 81-2). On re-examining these passages, the reader finds that Professor Derham has a hedging foot-note, and that Dr. Stoljar has a foot-note referring to Mr. Martin's paper. The matter is clarified when the reader reaches the discussion in Mr. Martin's paper (pp. 98-101). Again, Dr. Stoljar gives adequate consideration to the question whether Maitland held the realist theory of corporations and shows how difficult it is to give an unequivocal answer (pp. 38-40); but Professor Webb gives a brief pronouncement on this question (pp. 47-8).

Apparently publication was dilatory and editing minimal. Two of the papers describe a 1955 case as having been recently decided (pp. 81 and 98), but the Preface (of four pages) bears a 1958 date. Mr. Pike writes of 'Taxable deductions in school fees' (p. 154) when he presumably means 'Tax deductions for school fees'; he writes that 'Membership in the State is compulsive' (p. 155); he writes of 'hierarchial church organizations' (p. 153) and 'hierarchial churches' (p. 156); he writes that members of non-episcopalian churches 'are less inhibited that obedience to the State is a moral duty' (p. 156); he misquotes Figgis (p. 156) in a way that should have aroused the suspicions of an editor acquainted with Figgis; and in his discussion of the statute that was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in the *Kedroff* case, which the editor discusses in one of his own papers, he makes the preposterous statement: 'As another purpose of the statute was to protect the State's pulpits from becoming a propaganda organ of a foreign power, it was doubly unconstitutional' (p. 150).

Standards of accuracy are uneven. They are high when Professor Webb *sics* 'villians' instead of correcting it (p. 182) – in a quotation from Professor T. P. Jenkin, on whom he had said two pages earlier he had 'depended mainly' for 'the ensuing analysis of New Deal pluralism'. But, as already indicated, sometimes they are low. Space does not permit detailed consideration of omission of references, and incompleteness and inaccuracy of references; of inconsistency in form of references, in spelling, in typography, and between the Contents page and the heads of the individual papers; of deficiencies in the Table of Cases; or of errors in proof-reading (all but two of those noticed are in the papers on political pluralism).

K. J. SCOTT

RETURN TO CHINA by JAMES BERTRAM. Heinemann, 1957. 251 pages.

THIS BOOK is based on a visit to China in May 1956 with a group from New Zealand and it opens with an interesting account of the author's struggles with the right-wing obscurantists who appeared to consider that, in dealing with a Communist country, ignorance is strength and should be preserved.

As an account of the author's subjective impressions the book is easy reading and seems to be fair; unfavourable impressions are recorded as well as favourable ones. As a contribution to our knowledge of China under Communist rule it is very disappointing. The obvious criticism is, 'What a far better book could have been written if only the author had done enough home work before going to ask the right questions.' One may well be dissatisfied with the studies of Communist-ruled societies in general and of China in particular which have been produced in the non-Communist world, but enough serious work has been done to give some idea of what questions are important and where more information is badly needed.

For example, while there is a lot of evidence to show that the Chinese Communist regime has made great progress in industrialisation, its performance in agriculture is much more uncertain. The author has seen something of the countryside under the old régime, and a report giving impressions of present conditions would have been very interesting. In fact, we are only told of a visit to one state-managed dairy farm (and any sort of dairy farm is quite exceptional in China). We are told that the average wage on this farm was Ch$42 per month and that, 'All this corresponded with general information on rural incomes – Ch$40 a month is apparently something like a basic wage for the Chinese farmer' (p. 133). To anyone with a little background this is a remarkable figure which, if it could be confirmed, would show that the Communist agrarian programme had been outstandingly successful. Ch$40 would buy over 400 lb. of rice at the Shanghai retail price and considerably more in the countryside. In fact, surveys of rural conditions published later in the Peking press gave figures showing that 15 per cent. of peasant families had incomes per head of less than Ch$40, not per month but per year, and the average was only Ch$60 per year. ('A Preliminary Study of the Income and Living Standards of the Peasants of China', Peking, *Jen Min Jih Pao,* May 5, 1957.) To reconcile the figures one would have to assume the average peasant family with one worker to seven unproductive dependents, which is certainly not true.

Again, we are told that Chou En-lai stated that taxation of peasant incomes ranged between 5 per cent. and 8 per cent. while in the budget statement a month later it was announced that tax rates on peasant incomes went up to 12 per cent (p. 158.) No attempt is made to reconcile the apparent contradiction between these statements, and there is no sign of any realisation that the burden on the peasants, who deal with government monopolies both for selling and buying, depends as much on government price policy as on taxation policy.

The author might argue that he is not an economist, but the same basic criticism can be illustrated in other fields. There is a shrewd comment on the audience at a special performance of Peking opera, 'The great majority, it appeared, were officials and "cadres" – that is, Party administrators and specially trained liaison field workers; . . . The atmosphere in the lobbies was what one might expect to find in a club for senior civil servants; if indeed a new mandarinate is being recruited in China today, this was a good sample of it' (p. 142). There are no signs of any realisation that this comment has raised one of the most important and serious issues in a Communist society, whether or not the Communist Party is developing into a new bureaucratic ruling class. Titoist criticism of the CPSU raised this issue in 1950, and it was raised independently in China in 1957 during the period of comparative freedom. In the 'anti-rightist' campaign, which is still going on, a whole series of articles by orthodox writers have denounced Chu An-p'ing's theory of the 'Party Empire' (Tang Tien Hsia) and those who sympathised with it. The question is an absolutely fundamental one for any judgment about the future development of Communist societies, but, apart from this one incidental comment, the author never seems to have considered it.

Again, it is noted that for the younger generation, 'All public issues were black-and-white; in the world outside China – which they only knew from a propagandist press, and from occasional visitors like ourselves – there were only the friends of peace and the enemies of peace', and it is commented that this is 'potentially very dangerous' (p. 120). But there are no signs that the author ever asked people to explain how they reconciled their claims to want peaceful co-existence with the policy of the official publicity apparatus in giving the Chinese people a completely distorted picture of the outside world, in terms of which it would not be possible to follow the sort of policies likely to secure peace. (When the reviewer tried to raise this issue in 1954 he was given a completely evasive and disingenuous answer, delayed until the day he left China, and could obtain no answer to letters in which he tried to continue the discussion.)

In his conclusion the author says, 'But I have certainly no bias in favour of Communist theory, and a very considerable bias against Communist practice. Liberal humanism is an unfashionable and perhaps an ineffectual creed; it is the only one I can profess.' The reviewer would argue that it is an ineffectual creed precisely because of the defects which this book illustrates, the refusal to apply serious and scientific thinking to the problems of society. From the evidence available in 1956 it could have been predicted with a fair degree of confidence that the liberalisation of the Communist regime in China could only continue and become stable if certain modifications were made in Communist theory and organisation; and by asking the right questions the author could have obtained experimental evidence as to whether or not this was likely to happen. In fact it was left to the Chinese intellectuals to raise the basic questions, and many of the people mentioned in the book have now been penalised for raising them. (There are, for example, a number of references to Fei Hsiao-t'ung's anthropological study of a Chinese village and Fei Hsiao-t'ung has been denounced as 'treacherous and ugly' and dismissed from his positions because this study was critical of the some aspects of the situation under Communist rule. And the remaining non-Communist parties have been told that they have no future except through the complete and uncritical acceptance of Communist leadership.) The developments of the 'anti-rightist' campaign, falsifying the author's predictions about the course of developments in China, must cast doubt on the validity of his concluding recommendations for Western policy.

MICHAEL LINDSAY

EARLY VICTORIAN NEW ZEALAND: A STUDY OF RACIAL TENSION AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES, 1839-1852, by DR. J. MILLER. Oxford University Press, 1958. 217 pages.

THIS BOOK contains much to interest students of politics as well as students of history. The political issues in the 1840's in New Zealand were complex, political divisions deep and bitter. Controversy was unusually strident and, perhaps, more than usually one-sided and ill-informed. Dr. Miller's careful and extensive research, which he presents in an attractive manner, has added much to our knowledge of this important period, and his book makes a useful contribution to our understanding of it. However, the title of the book is hardly justified. The author is concerned mainly with one part of New Zealand – the central districts, in which the New Zealand Company placed the settlements of Wellington, Nelson and New Plymouth. But Aucklanders, as Dr. Miller recognises, were 'Early Victorians' too; the rather high-flown title (so much inferior to Dr. Miller's excellent chapter-headings) distracts attention from the fact that the book is not quite a full discussion of the Wakefield theory in operation, nor is it a comprehensive account of racial tension in a crucial period of the history of race relations, nor a full analysis of colonial society. The book is marred by 'bittyness', which will restrict its appeal to the general reader though not its considerable value to students of politics and history.

First in importance among the political divisions of the 1840's was the racial question – not only the division between the races, but the bitter disagreements among Europeans about how the racial problem was to be tackled. At the same time, there was noisy rivalry between Auckland, the seat of government, and Wellington, the 'capital' of the New Zealand Company's district. These two political divisions overlapped, for the Governor, his officials and the missionaries in the north took an entirely different view of the native question from that espoused by the Company's officials and settlers in central districts. As Dr. Miller makes plain in a well-documented, conclusive analysis, the Company's representatives in New Zealand and the Company itself in England were hostile to the Treaty of Waitangi and sought to nullify its effects by every means in their power. He also shows that the hostility of the majority of settlers to the government's native policy continued into the late 1840's and forms an important element in the agitation for self-government. Some at least hoped that the granting of self-government would put an end to 'the humbug Treaty of Waitangi' – as indeed happened in the 1860's.

The Company in England and its representatives and settlers in New Zealand were united in opposition to the Colonial office, the Governor, his officials, the missionaries and the settlers of Auckland. The Company had powerful friends in Parliament. It was served, in both England and New Zealand, by able and energetic propagandists; and in E. G. Wakefield, his elder brother William and his son Jerningham, the Company possessed advocates who were masters of the technique of smear. The Colonial office and the colonial governors (Hobson and then FitzRoy) could make no adequate reply, as they were responsible for the welfare of the settlers and for keeping the peace between the races, though among the Auckland settlers were some who hit back hard. However, most historians have neglected the Auckland side of the story, and the reader of Dr. Miller's book has a pleasant feeling of justice done at last.

The Company and its settlers were, however, far from united in anything except opposition to government policy. The Company had, in the words of Arthur Wakefield, Company Agent at Nelson, held out 'prospects the most preposterous' to its settlers. Naturally enough, these prospects failed to materialise for a large number of the settlers, with a result that men of property sued the Company for breach of contract and labourers demonstrated against its agents. The settlements were soon in difficulties; the Company's affairs in chaos. However, the Company's settlements do not stand out as conspicuous failures in the general history of British colonisation. What makes the failure conspicuous is the way it was hushed up by the Company and by later writers who have toed the Company line and given the Company a more important place in New Zealand history than it deserves.

MICHAEL TURNBULL

THIS NEW ZEALAND by F. L. W. WOOD. Paul's Book Arcade Ltd., Hamilton, 1958. 272 pages.

PROFESSOR WOOD needs, of course, no introduction to the readers of this journal. His book, now in its fourth edition, has in an admirable and what seems to be an effortless manner achieved a double purpose and two objects. The two purposes were those of being informative for the benefit of the non-New Zealander (which one may presume was the original intention when the book was first published in New York during the war), and of affording New Zealanders a fresh look at themselves and at their own way of life.

The objective of giving a comprehensive account stripped of circumstantial detail of 'this' New Zealand in the present not only blends in with an account of how this New Zealand came to be what it is in the course of its short history. The manner in which this is done is a shining example of the historian's most difficult task: to explain the present through the past. Moreover, this was done not once, that is, when 1944 was the present, but Professor Wood has managed to keep the present moving forward through time – it is now 1957. To be able to succeed in this 'dynamics' of presentation, it was clearly not enough to bring the record up to date from time to time. As the present merges into the past, it undergoes significant changes in many ways, with consequent changes in relevance and emphasis of past facts and events. Only a work that has that dynamics built into its very structure will grow organically from revision to revision. The author not only employs his well-tempered judgment and that flair for the right phrasing, for which he has been commended by better pens than this, but his essential view of the subject must be just right in its most general conceptions to remain valid in the changing lights thrown on it by the passing of time. 'Modern New Zealand continues to illustrate the homely truth that a community is best studied in its history and in the environment which guides and limits local initiative.'

If from a wealth of material one may pick one illustration, I would choose it from the longest chapter, that on the Maori people. 'They have a complex, tribally based nationality of their own, and their relations with the pakeha are not only a matter of brown men and white but of a cultural minority dealing with a generally sympathetic but not always well-informed majority.' The full implications of this viewpoint are, without an understanding of the anthropology and history of the Maori and of colonialism, not easy to grasp for a competent student of race relations, as a recent instance has proved. But it is the best possible if not the only valid starting point for appreciating what is significant in a slow, gradual and quiet process of assimilation of two cultural traditions in a common geographic and social environment.

The eminently historical aspect of the present becoming the past is one of the central themes of the book. But it is no less important to pay attention to the equally – and for the political scientist often more – absorbing aspect of the future becoming the present. Here again the reader will be rewarded by a masterly summary. 'Problems of expansion,' Professor Wood finds, 'were tackled in characteristic New Zealand fashion, haphazardly, with individual goodwill and competence rather than coherent planning, and with parsimonious optimism rather than with vision.' Is not this true of our attitude (and in our more complacent moods, we like to think of our thoroughly democratic attitude) to problems of land development, of overseas markets, of building manufacturing industries, of communication and traffic tangles, of migration and settlement, of the education system, of economic and social policies in general? At what point in his narrative Professor Wood permits himself this slight show of impatience, the reader will see for himself as he studies the chapters on government, farming, industry, and so forth. Let it only be said here that the above quotation does not refer to town and country planning for which Professor Wood has reserved a more critical thrust. 'There have been modest excursions into the badly neglected field of town planning.'

E. G. JACOBY

THE MACHINERY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT by R. M. JACKSON. London, Macmillan, 1958. 360 pages.

THE HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND by JOSEPH REDLICH and FRANCIS W. HIRST. Edited with Introduction and Epilogue by BRYAN KEITH LUCAS. Macmillan, 1958. 261 pages.

DR. JACKSON'S BOOK is mainly about English local government. He discusses the nature of local government, and describes the committee system, elections, finance, bylaws, and local body areas and powers. He tests English practice in the light of theory and commonsense. The book is practical and simply written – two qualities which will commend it to most readers.

It is of interest here because ' local authorities in different countries are engaged in work that is much the same, and their troubles are much the same '. The problems associated with the existence of small local bodies, for example, are almost as pressing in England as they are in New Zealand. Dr. Jackson sees no prospect at present of any substantial reorganisation. ' Once a system of local government gets established it seems to be remarkably difficult to make any great change so long as there is no actual breakdown.' New Zealand experience undoubtedly supports that view.

The book shows the extent to which local government here differs from the system now in use in England. New Zealand local bodies might with advantage adopt some English practices – for example that of co-opting suitable members of the public to serve on many local body committees.

The Machinery of Local Government can be commended as a comprehensive and clear survey of a current topic of considerable importance.

The History of Local Government in England, admirably edited and brought up to date by Bryan Keith Lucas, continues to be unrivalled as a picture of the political and constitutional aspects of local government history.

R. J. POLASCHEK

AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRACY : AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM by A. F. DAVIES. Longmans, Green and Co., Melbourne, 1958. 161 pages.

THIS IS an idiosyncratic, irritating and at times perceptive book. It is intended as an introduction to the Australian political system. The author admits that it is opinionated, and nobody need quarrel with this. Every author has a right to his opinions, so long as he can substantiate them ; if authors did not have opinions we should never get explanations. But Mr. Davies is inclined to be mysterious about what his opinions actually are, and to withhold the evidence on which he bases them. There is a *knowing* air about his writing, a constant note of 'I could an' I would', which I find irritating and which students might find bewildering. So far as I can understand his central theme, it seems to be that Australians have a natural talent for bureaucracy, and that the country shows a 'depreciation of politics vis-à-vis administration'. This is possibly true ; certainly it would be a profitable theme for a full-scale examination of Australian politics. But there is no attempt to prove or even to demonstrate it. Mr. Davies asserts that public servants in the Federal sphere are very important, and implies that politicians are unimportant. But there is little or no evidence to support either contention.

Australian Democracy is, then, a book with a promising main theme which is not pursued. It has a sub-theme which is developed with some vigour ; this is that federalism, of which Australia is usually regarded as one of the prime examples, is 'only a matter of degree', and that the States are ciphers in government. Again, this is a promising theme. But Mr. Davies spoils it by over-stating his case to a point where it becomes ludicrous. Twice he puts the Australian States on the same footing as English county councils, at one point maintaining that public utilities 'are the main responsibilities of state governments not shared by English county councils'. He arrives at this plainly erroneous conclusion by way of the assumption that power over economic affairs is what gives a government importance. Roughly speaking, his argument is that because such slender powers of general economic control as government possesses are in the hands of the Federal authorities, the States do not matter. But in fact, although the basis of Australian political activity is undoubtedly economic, the issues of politics are not all economic issues ; and the States have almost a monopoly of those non-economic questions about which controversy can arise. In recent years these have included drinking, gambling, crime, public morality, hospitals, schools, universities, professional standards, the courts, the public domain and public health, any one of which can cause a political hubbub. In any case, the directly economic functions of the States, in fields such as housing, transport, industrial regulation, company law, lands, agriculture and marketing, make them governments of power of far greater standing than English county councils, which are obviously derivative bodies in every fibre of their being. It is a matter of simple observation that State governments matter. They may not matter *as much* as the Federal government, taken all in all, but that is not the point. What the Wheare theory of federalism asserts is that federalism exists where the regional and national governments are beyond one another's reach in certain fields; and this is true of Australia, as it is untrue of England or South Africa. Mr. Davies's whole approach to this matter seems to me quite wrong-headed, and explicable only in terms of fixed ideas which he is not prepared to submit to examination. They lead him to denigrate Wheare without proof, and to attribute to Professor Partridge and me a similarity of argument with the Minority and Majority Reports of the Royal Commission on the Constitution which does not exist.

However, there are perceptive and useful sections on electoral systems, the framework of the Federal government, the practice of Federal-State relations, and Upper Houses. There are some mordant comments on local government; and Gallup Polls have been used to advantage in discussing electors' attitudes. Mr. Davies has been generous in his acknowledgment of other people's work. He has also set an example of obscurity in utterance which one hopes will not be followed by many other writers. It is exciting but fatiguing to work out what he means by such statements as this about the Communist Party: 'Membership now bears a sociological rather than a political significance, providing a species of "counter-community" for its two kinds of recruits: Oedipal graduates in the oral professions, and the under-educated ambitious to possess a culture, if necessary by force.'

There are certain errors. Widows' pensions are much more recent than maternity allowances, not the other way about (p. 6); the Northern Territory is administered by the Department of Territories and not the Department of the Interior (p. 7); the footnote on page 81 gives the wrong title to W. S. Livingston's *Federalism and Constitutional Change;* the author writes 'degressive' where he clearly means 'regressive' (p. 132); the local government franchise in New South Wales is not a ratepayer one (p. 134); J. A. McCallum is misquoted and given the wrong date (p. 138). The printer's gremlin has been hard at work. 'Bureauracy' appears twice, the Statute book is added to 'ad infinitium', conditions are 'solidary' and the electoral system 'shivels' representation, legislation is 'chalenegd', motives are 'superceded', and States have 'Ministeries'. There is a Joycean undertone about 'neighbourhods' and 'featurres'.

J. D. B. MILLER

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE by A. H. ROBERTSON. Stevens, 1956. 252 pages.

THIS BOOK has little in common with recent *general* works on European organisations which analyse the notion of 'Europe' as an entity or speculate on the possible achievements or limits of European Union. It is a down-to-earth description of the actual history and working of the Council by a person who has been one of its officials. The analysis stays close to the 1949 Statute which created the Council and to the official documents of the Assembly, the Committee of Ministers and so on.

True, the powers of the Council are limited, and it has recently been overshadowed in public discussion by other 'European' bodies. Even if the Assembly persuades the Committee of Ministers that a particular thing should be done, the Committee can only make a *recommendation* to the member Governments, and not a decision that will be binding upon them. Sometimes in the debates in the Assembly the participants themselves have been aware that they are limited to talk, even more strictly than are the members of national parliaments. One speaker compared some of the Assembly's debates to an operatic soldiers' chorus which repeatedly chanted 'avançons !', but remained on the stage to sing the same words once more.

However, the author clearly brings out the achievements of the Council. These include the organisations to which it has given rise, notably the European Coal and Steel Community. Nor is the Council's work to be judged in clear-cut terms of success (E.C.S.C.) or failure (European Defence Community). Mr. Robertson writes: 'Of the five proposals made by the Assembly in 1950 and 1951 for the creation of 'Specialised Authorities' it thus appears that none achieved precisely the results intended, but that three – and those probably the most important – did induce the governments to take action and set up new machinery for the better co-ordination and development of European agriculture, inland transport and air transport. . . . The important thing . . . is that the ideas launched by the Assembly have subsequently borne fruit, even though not as originally proposed.'

He also points to the influence the Assembly exercises via its members' informed participation in the deliberations of their national parliaments. And he points to the growing importance of the Assembly itself as a forum for debates on broad political questions.

The Council remains a central piece in the European jigsaw, and this is the authoritative book on it.

R. S. MILNE

SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS by MORTON A. KAPLAN. John Wiley, New York, 1957. 280 pages, plus index.

IN ATTEMPTING 'to analyse international politics systematically and theoretically' Professor Morton Kaplan has been forced to discard a good many familiar words and phrases because they are imprecise, emotive or too long-winded for frequent repetition. A certain amount of effort is required from the reader in order to master the new terminology, but anyone, who, through pique against the Kaplanese, fails to read this book, denies himself a very stimulating experience.

The author, always making his assumptions explicit, considers in the abstract various actual and possible international systems ('balance of power', bipolar, universal etc.), and deals systematically with their implications. Actual international events are not therefore the starting point of the analysis but only cases to which it can be applied. They can be discussed with the same objectivity as the historian brings to events which occurred two or three hundred years ago.

The book includes a section on games theory, simply expounded for the non-mathematician. Even this reviewer was able to add game theoretic analysis to his heuristic equipment.

R. J. HARRISON

Book Notes

Political Theory: What is it? is Professor G. E. C. Catlin's inaugural lecture at McGill (Orton Press, London, 28 pages). It is as provocative as the author's other writings ('Political Science, which is one part of political theory, is undistinguishable, in my view, on any intellectually respectable grounds from sociology'), and contains a spirited defence of the theory of Natural Law, 'properly stated'. Professor J. D. B. Miller's inaugural at Leicester, *Politicians* (Leicester University Press, 19 pages), is a capable defence of politicians against the extremer forms of vilification, on the ground that they perform indispensable functions in a free political system.

In *International Institutions* (trans. by J. M. Chapman, Allen and Unwin, 316 pages) Mr. Paul Reuter gives a severely summarised presentation of the material relevant to a course in 'International Institutions'. After some definitions the origins of the present pattern of International Relations are described, then the concepts of International law and their application in the day-to-day relations between States, and, finally, International Organisations. The emphasis throughout is legal. This is tough, rather lean meat for the student. The only thing Mr. Ernest Lefever really has to say in *Ethics and United States Foreign Policy* (Meridian Books, N.Y., 180 pages) is that Hans Morgenthau's 'realist' position is in accord with the Judaeo-Christian view of the 'morally ambiguous nature of man'. His analysis is at the 'homespun wisdom' level though the style is pompous: 'World politics is a vast, unending drama' and, on the same page, 'The drama of world politics is an intense unending and universal struggle of power and purpose among men and nations.' Mr. Romain Yakemtchouk's *La Ligne Curzon et la 2^e^ Guerre Mondiale* (Editors, Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 118 pages and bibliography) traces Polish-Soviet relations from 1938, when Poland was expressing her hostility to the proposed passage of Russian troops to assist Czechoslovakia, to 1945, when the refusal by the Polish cabinet to accept the Curzon line led immediately to the creation of the puppet Lublin government and satellite status of Poland. His previous book, only now received for review, *L'O.N.U. La Sécurité Régionale et le Problème du Régionalisme* (Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 275 pages and bibliography) saw Regionalism as a possible *via media* between outworn nationalism and still rather nebulous concepts of internationalism.

On the more specific question of Federalism there is *Le Fédéralisme* edited by Gaston Berger (Presses Universitaires de France, 1958, xxx pages) which deals not only with the classic examples of Federalism but also with the recent approaches towards it made in N.W. Europe.

In the same series (Bibliothèque des Centres d'études Supérieures Spécialisés) are La *Défense Nationale* (622 pages) and (ed. Louis Trotabas) *Politique et Technique* (385 pages): the latter has a good general article by André Siegfried. All three books contain contributions by distinguished authorities and are to be warmly commended.

A relatively new quarterly, *Africa South* (published from 2 Vlam Gebou, Parliament Street, Cape Town) aims 'to encourage the idea of a multi-racial democracy in South Africa, based on equal rights for all people'. The Jan.-Mar. 1958 issue includes contributions by E. V. Stone, Basil Davidson, Anthony Sampson and Colin Legum. The July-September issue of *The Political Quarterly* is also of special interest, being devoted to *The Passing of Colonialism.* Outstanding among the contributors are Colin Legum on Ghana and W. H. Morris-Jones on India and Pakistan.

Another product of many contributors is *The Soviet Cultural Scene 1956-1957,* edited by Walter Z. Laqueur and George Lichtheim (Atlantic Books, 296 pages). In it are reprinted thirty articles from the periodical *Soviet Survey,* treating various aspects of the cultural and intellectual life of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe between the Twentieth Congress and the Fortieth Anniversary. Some unevenness, and occasional outdated comments, are inevitable in a collection of this sort; but the importance of the period, and the competence of the articles, justify this attempt to reach a wider public.

On comparative government, there have appeared recently *Modern Governments* by Harold Zink (Van Nostrand, 804 pages) and *Free Elections* by W. J. M. Mackenzie (Minerva series, Allen and Unwin, 184 pages). The Zink book is a good example of a reliable and perceptive textbook which does not neglect the smaller countries. The sections on Britain and Germany are particularly fine, and, unlike the former Ogg and Zink text, there is a section on India. The Mackenzie book draws most of its material from Britain, France, Germany and some of the emergent states in Africa. It is written with clarity and the author's usual blend of sophistication and commonsense. The reference to New Zealand on the top of page 111 is misleading, but this is atypical of the book.